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As a result of decisions by the United States Supreme Court,I and the
passage of state2 and federal3 civil rights statutes, legal barriers to racially
integrated housing have become practically nonexistent.4 The focus of the
courts and the legislatures has shifted to the problem of "exclusionary"
zoning, whereby the zoning power is used by local governments in various
ways to prevent the influx of lower income groups into a particular area.5
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania courts have attempted to deal
with the legal aspects of the problem, and have, with some success,
undercut the effectiveness of exclusionary devices. 6 In addition, much has
been written on the social consequences of exclusionary zoning.7
Less evident, but becoming increasingly conspicuous, are
mechanisms by which ownership and occupancy of land is restricted to a
particular age group. Such discrimination often is designed to exclude
children from particular housing opportunities. While litigation involving
this situation was unheard of a decade ago,8 cases are arising with
increasing frequency. In addition, public recognition of the problems
created by age-restrictive housing is becoming increasingly evident.9
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University College of Law.
1. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2. At least 40 states and the District of Columbia have passed Fair Housing Laws or have
provisions in state civil rights statutes barring discrimination on the basis of race in thesale orrental of
housing. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW, § 296.2-a, 3-b (McKinney Supp. 1978).
3. See, e.g., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3619,3631 (1976).
4. This is not to say, of course, that social segregation in housing has become an insignificant
problem. Rather, the author only means to point out that there is no longer any legal basis upon which
housing can be maintained in a racially segregated manner.
5. See, Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Seard of a Remedy, 6 J.L REF. 625
(1973).
6. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,336
A.2d 713 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,341 N.E.2d 236,378 N.Y.S.2d 672
(1975); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Sager, 7ight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning. Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 767, 780-793 (1969).
8. The author's research disclosed no cases dealing with age restrictions decided by appellate
courts prior to 1971.
9. Recently, the popular television magazine, "60 Minutes," presented a feature story on the
difficulty encounted byfamilies with children in locating rental housing in the southern California area.
"60 Minutes," July 30, 1978, copyright CBS-TV. See notes 12-13 infra.
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I intend in this article to examine the federal constitutional aspects of
age-restrictive devices designed to exclude children. While it will become
apparent in the course of the analysis that certain empirical data are
necessary to the legal result, I have made no effort to acquire that data for
purposes of this article since the present goal is to create an appropriate
framework for analysis of constitutional questions. The focus of the article
will be on the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment and will necessitate a close analysis of the relevant cases. It is
hoped that this article will clarify the constitutional issues arising in this
context and provide a basis for their resolution, especially since no other
works seem to deal comprehensively with the subject.10
This article will first briefly outline the present inpact of the problem
of age-restrictive housing and the forms through which age discrimination
has occurred and is most likely to occur in the future. It will then closely
examine each of these exclusionary devices, including an analysis of the
reported cases and the likelihood of success of future federal constitutional
challenge, the mechanism used to accomplish the exclusion, and the state
interest asserted. Finally, it will demonstrate the difficulties in applying
federal constitutional law to some methods of age restriction, particularly
the difficulties presented by the necessity for finding the requisite state
action.
II. THE PROBLEM
The existence of age-restrictive housing in the United States appears
widespread. Retirement communities employing a number of ex-
clusionary devices abound,1 and "swinging singles" apartments and
condominiums barring children and even childless marrieds can be found
advertised in many metropolitan newspapers.1 2 It has been asserted that
the shortage of rental housing available to families with children has
reached the critical stage in some cities.13
This increasing exclusivity occurs at a time when there exists a general
shortage of adequate housing, especially in the rental market. Vacancy
10. An excellent article dealing exclusively with the constitutional aspects of retirement
communities may be found at Doyle, Retirement Communities: The Nature and Enforceability of
Residential Segregation by Age, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 64 (1977). See also Note, Housing Discrininatlon
Against Children: The Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. FAM. L. 559, 588-92 (1978).
11. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 64-65, and authorities cited therein.
12. See, e.g., Columbus Dispatch, July 4,1978, at D-9, col. 4. See also Adults Only, TIME, July 3,
1978, at 67.
13. TIME, supra note 12, at 67. In New Orleans only one of every four apartments is available to
families with children, while in Los Angeles the figure is 60%. Id. The author's survey of the classified
sections of two recent newspapers in Columbus, Ohio, reveals that between 30 and 40 percent of tile
rental housing is available to adults only. Columbus Dispatch, July 4, 1978, at D-9, col. 1; Columbus
Citizen-Journal, July 4, 1978, at 20, col. 2. These figures represent a percentage of advertisements for
furnished and unfurnished rental housing stipulating "adults only," "no children," or similar language,
to total rental advertisements. They do not, of course, include landlords who do not indicate the age-
exclusive nature of the housing in the ad, but nevertheless refuse to rent to families with children. Cf.
"60 Minutes," supra note 9.
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rates in Manhattan are presently only 1 1/2-2%14 and many other major
cities have similar vacancy rates. 5 As a result of these two trends, many
couples with children, primarily in the lower and middle income brackets,
are finding it virtually impossible to find suitable housing.16
Presently only six states have statutes prohibiting discrimination in
rental housing because children are present among the prospective
tenants.' 7 A number of others have general provisions in their civil rights
statutes barring discrimination in housing on the basis of age,'8 but it is
problematic whether these provisions preclude discrimination based upon
the presence of children.' 9
It is not surprising, therefore, that the 1970s is the only decade that has
seen significant litigation challenging the validity of devices designed to
promote age-homogeneous living. It is only more recently that the plain-
tiffs in such cases have been the persons excluded from the desired housing,
rather than taxpayer-neighbors of the restricted housing.20 Much of the
litigation has focused on the provision of age-exclusive housing for the
elderly, or more accurately, those of retirement age. 2' Recently, however,
an increasing amount of litigation has centered upon housing which
14. The Tight U.S. Apartment Squeeze, TIME, May 1, 1978, at 43.
15. The Great Apartment Squeeze of the 70s, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., May 8,1978,at93-
95.
16. It is no answer to the problem to say that families with children have no cause forcomplaint
since, as a result of a very low general vacancy rate, their obtaining housing that is presently closed to
them would merely result in someone else being excluded from the desired housing. First, thesituation
is not that there are no vacancies; therefore it is likely that some housing is vacant at any point in time
that maybe desirable to families with children. More importantly, a denial of the right to compete with
others for available housing is itself an important denial. It certainly would not be acceptable to denya
Black the right to compete for a limited number of law school places by saying that, if accepted, he
would merely displace someone else.
17. Agiz. REv. STAT. § 33-1317 (Supp. 1978-79); DEL. CODE tit. 25 § 6503 (1975); ILL At .
STAT. ch. 80, §§ 37-38 (Smith-Hurd 1966 & Supp. 1979); MAss. ANN. LAws. ch. 151B, § 4.11
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1976); NJ. STAT. ANN. §2A: 170-92 (West 1971); N.Y. REALPROP. LAW§§236-
37 (McKinney 1968). The Attorney General of Michigan has issued an opinion interpreting the age
discrimination provisions of Michigan's Fair Housing Law to prohibit a landlord from refusing to rent
to a prospective tenant because of the presence of children. See [1975-1976] MicH. ATVr GENa.
BIENNIAL REP. 413 (1976).
18. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (West Supp. 1979) (does not apply, however, to privately
owned housing developed and maintained exclusively forpersons within aspecified agegroup); Mor.
Rav. CovEs ANN. § 64-306 (Supp. 1977) (does permit discrimination on the basis of level of maturity or
ability to handle responsibility); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A.8.v. (1966 & Supp. 1977). Seealso CAL.
CiV. CODE § 51 (West Supp. 1979) as interpreted in Marine Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 47 U.S.L.W. 2437
(CaL Super. App. Div. 1978) (statute broadly interpreted to proscribe arbitrary discrimination based
on age although statute does not specifically mention age).
19. Since the child is not acutally the lessee of the apartment in most cases, a restrictive
interpretation of an age discrimination provision may not prohibit a refusal to rent because of the
presence of children in a family, since the refusal occurs not as a result of the age of the lessee, but
because the lessee has chosen to have children. But see [1975-1976] Mici. ATr'Y G N. BIENNIAL REP.
413 (1976).
20. See cases cited at notes 231, 232 infra.
21. Generally, such restrictions establish a minimum age of either fifty-two or fifty-five, which
can hardly be described as 'elderly." See, e.g., Taxpayers Ass'n of WeymouthTwp., Inc. v. Weymouth
Twp., 71 NJ. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976) (minimum age of fifty-two years); Campbell v. Barraud, 58
App. Div. 2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977) (minimum age of fifty-five years).
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"merely" attempts to exclude children, while permitting adults of any age
to reside therein.22
While early challenges to age-exclusionary housing are generally
successful, 23 the recent trend has been to uphold attempts to limit
occupancy to persons of certain defined ages. In fact, in only one case
decided after 1971 has a restriction been struck down as unconstitutional.
24
The fact that recent challenges to age-restrictive housing have not
generally been successful, however, is not particularly illuminating, since
the absolute number of cases is small in spite of the recent increase. In
addition, the cases involve fact patterns that differ greatly from each other,
and opinions that often fail to reach or discuss the constitutional issues.
Finally, many of the cases were decided before the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland25 which may have
important implications for age-restrictive housing, although perhaps not
as crucial in this context as some have predicted.26 Nevertheless, a close
scrutiny of the cases within an appropriate framework for constitutional
analysis will yield useful predictors in future constitutional litigation.
III. ZONING RESTRICTIONS
Age restrictions generally take one of four forms. Often the
restriction is accomplished by direct governmental action through a
zoning, or similar,27 ordinance. This ordinance can be either "in-
clusionary" or "exclusionary";28 both types have been upheld by the
courts. The second device is the use of restrictive covenants that run with
the land prohibiting occupancy by certain age-restricted groups. While this
device has appeared in only one or two cases,29 there is reason to believe
that it may be the least susceptible to constitutional challenge, at least if the
age restrictions are confined to a limited geographical area. 30 Rules or
22. See, e.g., Ritchey v. Villa Neuva Condominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App, 3d 688, 146 Cal, Rptr.
695 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Taxpayers Ass'n ofWeymouth Twp., Inc. v. Weymouth Twp., 125 N.J. Super. 376,
311 A.2d 187 (1973), rev'd, 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976); Shepard v. Woodland Twp. Comm, &
Planning Bd., 128 N.J. Super. 379, 320 A.2d 191 (1974), aff'don other grounds, 135 N.J. Super. 97,342
A.2d 853 (1975), rev'd, 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro, 116 N.J,
Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971).
24. Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla, App. 1977).
25. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
26. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 92-97.
27. See, Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp., Inc. v. Weymouth Twp., 71 N.J. 249, 259, 364
A.2d 1016, 1021 (1976). In this case, the relevant ordinance took the form of a regulatory ordinance
concerning the location and licensing of mobile home parks. Because of the nature of the specific
provisions of the ordinance, the court stated that it functioned as a zoning ordinace,
28. An "inclusionary" ordinance is one in which the zoning classification permits other uses, as
well as age-restrictive housing, within the zoning district. An " exclusionary" ordinance permits only
age-exclusive housing in the zoning district. For a discussion of the possible implications of this
dichotomy, and a criticism of its usefulness, see Note, Housing for the Elderly: Constitutional
Limitations and Our Obligations, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 423, 431-32 (1977).
29. See text accompanying notes 185-97 infra. See also Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d
112, 113-14 (Fla. App. 1977).
30. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 104-07.
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conditions established by a landlord or condominium association as part
of the contractual obligations of the owner or lessee are a third method
used to exclude families with children. Finally, a landlord or condominium
owner can merely refuse to initially rent or sell to a family which includes
children. 1
The zoning cases will be used as the vehicle for developing the
framework for substantive constitutional analysis. This is a desirable
approach for a number of reasons. First, the use of the zoning power
presents a clear case of governmental, as opposed to private, action.
Second, at least fifty percent of the decided cases challenging age-
restrictive housing concern zoning or similar municipal action. Most
important, almost all the reasoned discussion of constitutional issues
occurs within the context of these cases. The only drawback in using the
zoning cases as a primary focus is that they have, almost without
exception, involved attempts to establish "retirement communities,"
prohibiting occupancy by both children and many adults. Despite this, the
issues presented are similar to those presented by other exclusionary
devices, except for the important question of state action, and can
therefore suitably serve to accomplish the purpose stated above.
A. Pre-Moore Zoning Cases
The original concept of zoning was to sort out incompatible uses.
32
The idea was to separate industrial and heavily commercial areas from
residential districts, thereby protecting residential occupants from the
pollution, traffic, and other annoyances associated with those uses.33
Recently, however, the concept of the "public health, safety, and welfare,"
necessary to support the use of the zoning power, has expanded. An
increasing number of courts are recognizing the legitimacy of zoning solely
for aesthetic purposes,3 4 and even those that do not are quick to find other,
more traditional purposes to widen the scope of the zoning power.35 Thus,
minimum lot sizes, architectural requirements, minimum frontages, and
other requirements have been sustained by the courts.36 It is in this context
that age-restrictive housing must be considered; a context in which the
courts seem to have recognized that a municipality can legitimately
consider the needs, desires, and values of only a portion of the community
31. See text accompanying notes 257-73 infra.
32. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 453 (2d ed. 1975); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
33. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926). See also Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
34. See Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 NJ. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113
(1974); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
35. See, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 NJ. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); See also
Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222, 1226 (1968).
36. Senior v. Zoning Comm'n of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531,153 A.2d 415 (1959) (minimum
lot size); Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95,222 P.2d 439 (1950) (minimum width); State ex
reL Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (architectural standards relating to style).
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and set aside a segment of its territory for the exclusive accommodation of
that group.37
The first case involving an attempt at age-restrictive housing was
Molino v. Mayor of Glassboro.38 The borough of Glassboro, New Jersey,
established strict limitations on the building of garden apartments, which
severely limited the number of multi-bedroom units that could be
constructed, 39 and required, among other things, that those apartment
complexes include either tennis courts or swimming pools. The borough
candidly acknowledged that the primary purpose of the ordinance was "to
keep children out of Glassboro.,, 40 The court found that such apartments
would not be within the price range of either middle or lower income
families, and that there was no market in Glassboro for high-priced rental
housing.
While the court found the ordinance inconsistent with the state
enabling legislation41 and therefore beyond the zoning power of the
municipality, it also alluded to constitutional problems with the
ordinance:42 "There is also a right to live as a family, and not be subject to a
limitation on the number of members of that family in order to reside any
place. Such legal barriers would offend the equal protection mandates of
the Constitution. 43
A number of aspects of this case should be kept in mind. First, the
ordinance was applicable throughout the entire borough of Glassboro.
Second, the sole interest asserted by the borough for the exclusion of
children was fiscal. Finally, the court determined that there was a distinct
need for middle and lower income housing within the borough, and no
need for apartment housing for the affluent. Thus, the borough authorities
were acting contrary to the housing needs of their own residents, as well as,
perhaps, contrary to the needs of those who might wish to move to
37. See text accompanying notes 84-89 infra. Certainly not everyone in a community needs or
desires a single-family home on a large lot, but those people may still desire to live in the particular area
where these requirements are in force. Thus, while the municipality may have provided for their needs
and desires in another segment of the community, with respect to the portion in which such
requirements are applicable, the values of those desiring large-lot housing or, for example, tudor
architecture, are those which prevail.
38. 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971).
39. In any given apartment complex, at least 70% of the units could have no more than one
bedroom, no more than 25% of the units could have more than two bedrooms, and no more than five
percent of the units could have more than three bedrooms. Id. at 201, 281 A.2d at 403,
40. Id. at 201, 281 A.2d at 404.
41. The court found that the purpose of the ordinance was not consistent with the general
welfare standard of the state enabling legislation. Id. at 204,281 A.2d at 406. Depending upon a state's
interpretation of its own laws, this standard may or may not be the same as the general welfare standard
for regulatory legislation under the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See text
accompanying notes 145-81 infra.
42. The question whether a particular ordinance is beyond the zoning power of the municipality
may itself have constitutional implications. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra. See also Note,
supra note 28, at 437.
43. 116 NJ. Super. at 204, 281 A.2d at 405-06.
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Glassboro." As will be shown, all these facts have constitutional
significance.
In contrast to Molino, the first case of age-exclusive housing to reach
the New York appellate courts45 resulted in the validation of a zoning
ordinance that permitted, among other uses,46 "multiple residences
designed to provide living and dining accommodations, including social,
health care, or other supporting services and facilities for aged
persons . . . . In Maldini v. Ambro, the stated purpose of the
ordinance under attack was meeting the town's demonstrated need for
adequate housing for the aged in the community.48 The court upheld the
ordinance against the claim of local taxpayers that the presence of
retirement communities would result in the depreciation of their property
values. The court relied heavily on three factors: (I) the demonstrated need
in the community for housing for the aged; (2) the "inclusionary" nature of
the ordinance; and (3) the lack of discriminatory intent or effect of the
ordinance with respect to younger people in the community. In connection
with the latter two factors, neither the district in which such communities
were permitted nor the retirement community itself prohibited the
occupancy of younger persons. While the retirement housing was specially
designed to meet the physical needs of older persons, occupancy was not
limited to them.49 Also, there was no indication that the presence of such
housing would impose a hardship on any other segment of the population
in obtaining housing in the community.
While constitutional objections to the ordinance were apparently not
considered in Maldini,50 it obviously stands in marked relief to Molino. In
Molino, the motive behind the ordinance was fiscal rather than social; it
was intended to and had the effect of discriminating against younger
persons; it served to exacerbate rather than ameliorate housing problems
44. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township ofMt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151,336 A.2d
713 (1975) (holding that the relevant area for determining whether an ordinance is exclusionary is
whether it meets its fair share of the regional housing needs, not only those of the particular zoning
authority).
45. Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481,330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975).
46. The zoning classification also permitted single-family dwellings on minimum two acre plots,
farms, churches, schools, and libraries. Id. at 483, 330 N.E.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 485, 330 N.E.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
49. There was no minimum age requirement for residence in such communities. It was clear,
however, that they were to be specially designed for"aged" persons. Further, such communities were
the most profitable use of the land within thedistrict and thus had the effect of limiting usage within the
district to retirement communities. Id. at 489, 330 N.E.2d at 409, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 393 n.1 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
50. While the court does discuss the breadth of the zoning power under the Constitution and the
presumption favoring the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, it purports to decide the case on the
basis of whether the state enabling legislation requiring that land use regualtions must promote the
general welfare has provided a sufficient basis for the ordinance. Id. at 483, 330 N.E.2d at 405, 369
N.Y.S.2d at 388. It is possible, and perhaps likely, that the state enabling legislation delegated to the
municipality all of the state's constitutional police power in land use matters thereby making a
constitutional decision implicit. See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
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in the area; and it was applicable throughout the entire community. Had
the court in Maldini dealt with constitutional objections, it would likely
have found all the above to be of constitutional importance. 5'
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Taxpayers
Association v. Weymouth Township52 and Shepard v. Woodland
Township Committee & Planning Board.53 Both cases dealt with age-
exclusive housing effected by means of zoning or "quasi-zoning"
ordinances designed to meet the needs of older citizens. Although both
ordinances had been successfully challenged in the New Jersey Superior
Court,54 the state supreme court reversed the decisions and upheld the
ordinances.
In both cases, the ordinances were attacked by resident taxpayers
rather than excludees.55 The ordinance in Weymouth prohibited mobile
home parks in the township unless constructed and operated in accordance
with a number of restrictions. The challenged provisions required that at
least eighty percent of the mobile homes in any mobile home park contain
no more than two bedrooms and limited occupancy to "elderly persons" or
"elderly families." "Elderly persons" was defined as persons aged fifty-two
or older; "elderly families" as those headed by a person of such age or by a
person who had a spouse of such age.56 In Shepard, the ordinance
permitted the construction of "senior citizen communities" in a low-
density residential-agricultural district. Occupancy in those communities
was limited to persons over fifty-two years of age, except for one child
nineteen years of age or older living with his or her parent(s) or
guardian(s). Occupancy was limited to no more than three individuals.5 7
Construction and design requirements clearly indicated that the
communities were designed for more affluent senior citizens.
In both cases constitutional issues based upon both the federal and
state constitutions were fully considered. Because of the liberal state
standing rules,58 plaintiffs in both cases were permitted to raise the equal
protection and due process rights of younger excludees.
The court in Weymouth began its discussion by considering whether
the age-exclusive zoning was within the zoning power of the community.
51. See text accompanying notes 136-42 infra.
52. 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
53. 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976).
54. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Twp., 125 N.J. Super. 376,311 A.2d 187 (1973); Shepard v.
Woodland Twp. Comm. & Planning Bd., 128 N.J. Super. 379, 320 A.2d 191 (1974).
55. The taxpayers attacking the ordinance in Weymouth were concerned that the presence of
mobile home parks in the community would have an adverse effect on property values. A similar
concern over a decline in property values as a result of senior citizen communities in a low density
residential neighborhood prompted the plaintiffs in Shepard. Thus, the taxpayers were seeking to use
the age-exclusive nature of the housing to cause its complete removal, rather than to have it "opened
up" to excludees.
56. 71 N.J. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021.
57. 71 N.J. at 234, 364 A.2d at 1008.
58. 71 N.J. at 235, 364 A.2d at 1008 n.1; 71 N.J. at 263, 364 A.2d at 1023 n,5.
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While this is, in the first instance, a question of state law,59 the
determination is likely to have federal constitutional implications since the
zoning authority granted to the local government by the state enabling
legislation usually extends as far as the state's police power with respect to
land use matters. 60 Thus, the scope of legitimate activity of the
municipality is coterminous with the scope of the state's police power
under the United States Constitution. The real question, therefore, is
whether the state would have the power to provide age-exclusive housing
for the elderly. Another way of stating this is to ask whether the legislation
has as its goal a legitimate state purpose-a constitutional requirement for
state regulatory action.61
In determining whether the purpose of the ordinance was consistent
with the general welfare, the court recognized the expansive inter-
pretations given this term by both the United States Supreme Court and
the New Jersey courts. In doing so, the court recognized that the concept
permitted state action directed toward not only the physical needs, but also
the psychological and social needs of its population. Viewing the elderly as
having various psychological and social needs that can be met especially
well by age-homogeneous housing, the court upheld the ordinance as
furthering the general welfare because it met the "special" financial,
physical, psychological, and social needs of the older segment of the
population.62
The court then considered in detail equal protection and due process
challenges to the ordinance. For purposes of resolving the equal protection
challenge, the court used the "two-tiered" analytical approach. Under this
method of analysis, a statutory classification will be upheld if it is
rationally related to a legitimate state objective.63 If, however, the
classification involves "suspect" criteria or impinges upon "fundamental
rights," the state must assume the burden of showing that the classification
serves a "compelling state interest" and is neither over-inclusive nor under-
inclusive.64 Stating that age is not a suspect classification 5 and that
housing is not a fundamental right,66 the court applied the less strict
59. All municipal power is, of course, solely the result of delegation by the state.
60. See Note, supra note 28, at 437.
61. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-52 (1973); see also Perry, Substantive Due Process
Revisited: Reflections on (and beyond) Recent Cases, Nw. L. REv. 417, 419-20 (1976). The
constitutional requirement of a "legitimate state purpose" under the fourteenth amendment is thesame
as the "general welfare" requirement under the same amendment. A purpose will only be considered
"legitimate" if it furthers the general welfare. See Perry, id. at 420 n.16.
62. Lower income housing constructed to accommodate older persons, but not restricted to
them, would arguably meet the physical and economic needs of the elderly. However, it has been
argued that only age-homogeneous housing can meet their psychological and social needs. See Aozo,
June 1974, at 9; HoRizoN, Autumn 1973, at 23. See also Doyle, supra note 10, at 83-84 and authorities
cited therein.
63. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1972).
64. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
65. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
66. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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"rational basis" analysis, concluding that the age limitations were
rationally related to the legitimate state objective of providing housing
suited to the needs of the elderly.67 With respect to the substantive due
process challenge, the court merely stated that "the claim that the
ordinances violate the due process clause is little more than a restatement
of the contention that they contravene principles of equal protection"68
and upheld the ordinance on the basis of the same considerations.
In the final section of the opinion the court considered the effect of its
decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel69 The court recognized that its decision in Weymouth carried with
it the danger that zoning might be used by municipalities to restrict new
housing to categories of people who are net revenue producers or to
restrain increases in school expenditures by directly or indirectly excluding
families with children, both condemned in Mt. Laurel70 The court
concluded, however, that the plaintiff did not choose to try the case on a
theory of exclusionary zoning, and further stated that a municipality could
not provide the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing for all categories of persons required by Mt. Laurel unless it can
"design its land use regulations to provide for the unsatisfied housing needs
of specific, narrowly defined categories of people.'
The Shepard case relied heavily upon the reasoning of Weymouth for
the resolution of the due process and equal protection issues raised by the
plaintiffs, and its holding was consistent with the Weymouth decision. In
addition, however, it expanded upon age homogeneity as a legitimate tool
to meet the needs of the older segment of the population. It cited a number
of authorities indicating that the psychological and emotional needs of a
67. The court also found that the ordinance satisfied the more stringent requirements ofthe New
Jersey Constitution. Because the right to housing has a "preferred status" under the state constitution,
the court stated that the ordinance deserved "close scrutiny." Nevertheless, it found that the ordinanme
bore a "real and substantial relationship" to an "appropriate" governmental interest. 71 N.J. at 287,364
A.2d at 1037.
68. Id.
69. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975). The Mr. Laurel case was a landmark case dealing with
"exclusionary" zoning. It considered the validity of a municipal zoning ordinance that limited
residential housing to single family homes on large lots. The ordinance was attacked as a violation of
the state zoning enabling act and the state and federal constitutions since it effectively precluded low
and moderate income people from residing in the community despite the existence of substantial
undeveloped land.
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's state claims without reaching the federal
constitutional issue. The court stated that under the "general welfare" standard of the enabling
legislation and state constitution, a municipality's land use regulations must make proper provision for
adequate housing for all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries, including
those of low and moderate income. 67 N.J. 173-74,336 A.2d 731-32. At a minimum, the regulations ofa
developing municipality must insure that the municipality has provided its "fair share" of the present
and prospective needs for low and moderate income housing. Id.
70. Mi. Laurel was decided on the basis of the New Jersey Constitution. No United States
Supreme Court case has invalidated non-racially motivated exclusionary zoning. Cf. Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (intent to discriminate
necessary to require rezoning to accommodate low and middle income multi-family housing).
71. 71 N.J. at 293, 364 A.2d at 1040.
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large segment of the older community are met by age-restrictive housing72
and concluded that age restrictions are "both rationally related to the
concept of planned housing for the elderly and essential to the success of
such developments."" The court also noted that the ordinance was not
intended to preclude other classes of people from residing within the
community, but was intended to provide housing for a specific category of
people.74
The most recent zoning case was decided in 1977 by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court. In Campbell v. Barraud,75 the
court, as in the New Jersey cases, squarely faced the constitutional
questions raised by age-restrictive housing. The town of Bro.okhaven
amended its zoning ordinance by rezoning a ninety-six acre parcel as a
Planned Retirement Community (PRC), and limited occupancy in the
PRC district to persons fifty-five years of age or older.76 As in Weymouth
and Shepard, the plaintiffs were not excludees, but residents of the
township. They were, however, permitted by the court to raise the
constitutional objections of excludees.
Relying upon Maldini v. Ambro, the court stated that it is within the
zoning power to provide housing accommodations designed to satisfy the
economic, physical, psychological, and social needs of the elderly. Further,
the court noted that it would be "illogical to encourage the construction of
housing geared to the specialized needs of the elderly and then prohibit its
exclusive use by [that] group." 77 Thus, the age restriction was rationally
related to the laudatory and legitimate state purpose of providing housing
for the elderly, and the equal protection clause was satisfied, since age did
not constitute a suspect class. 78 The courts stated that even though the
ordinance established a separate zoning district, it did not establish an age-
segregated community "in any but the most strained sense of the word"09
since the effect of the ordinance was no different than if the PRC had
merely been a permissible use in a general residence district.3 0 Finally, the
court emphasized that neither the intent nor the effect of the ordinance was
to discriminate against any other group in the township that suffered from
exclusion or disadvantaged in its own housing needs. 1
72. Id. at 240-43, 364 A.2d at 1010-12.
73. Id. at 246, 364 A.2d at 1014.
74. Id. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1013.
75. 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977).
76. Id. at 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 911. The ordinance also permitted spouses under age 55 and
grandchildren over age 19 to reside in the PRC.
77. Id. at 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
78. Id. The court did not consider whether the classification impinged upon any fundamental
rights.
79. Id. at 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
80. See note 28 supra, and the Note cited therein.
81. 58 App. Div. 2d at573,394N.Y.S.2d at913. See Berenson v.TownofNcwCastle,38N.Y.2d
102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
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A number of factors can be extracted from these zoning cases that
may have implications for age-restrictive housing outside the context of
retirement communities. First, only one of the ordinances considered was
applicable throughout the entire area controlled by the zoning authority
and it was the only ordinance ultimately invalidated. Second, in the only
case in which the purpose of the ordinance was not to satisfy the housing
needs of a segment of the community, the restrictions were struck down. In
all of the cases in which age restrictions were upheld, the courts explicitly
recognized that the ordinance at issue would not result in the imposition of
a burden on other significant segments of the community in meeting their
housing needs.
Another important factor is that each of the courts upheld the validity
of administering to the needs of a particular segment of the populace to the
exclusion of others. While this is not surprising, since most federal and
state programs administer to the particular needs of only portions of the
population,8 2 it is noteworthy that the courts viewed it as legitimate to
consider social and psychological needs as well as economic and physical
ones, since age-restrictive housing is often proposed as satisfying such
needs.8 3 This result seems well supported by the United States Supreme
Court case of Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.8 4
Bell Terre is a small Long Island community 5 that restricted
permissible uses of its land (less than one square mile) to single-family
dwellings. "Family" was defined in the relevant ordinance as no more than
two persons unrelated by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit.8 6 There was no limit on the number
of related persons who could occupy a household.
Six students at the State University of New York at Stony Brook
attacked the ordinance as infringing upon their constitutional rights. They
asserted that the ordinance interfered with their right to travel, restricted
their freedom of association, interfered with their right to privacy, and
denied them equal protection of the law. Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, summarily dismissed all these objections.87 Then, in discussing
the legitimacy of addressing land use policy to family needs, he wrote: "The
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
82. See, e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,7 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976) (authorizing "parity
payments" to farmers); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1421.49 (1976) (authorizing price supports for certain agricultural
commodities); Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944,38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-27 (1976) as atnendedtn3l
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-27 (West Supp. 1979) (authorizing loan guarantees ard direct loans to veterans for
home construction).
83. This is particularly true in the case of retirement communities. See text accompanying notes
150-63 infra.
84. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
85. The village contained only 220 homes and approximately 700 people. 416 U.S. at 2.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 7-8.
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the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people."88
This passage strongly indicates that communities may design land use
such that certain areas are developed consistent with the needs and values
of only a portion of the community, to the exclusion of the needs and
values of other segments. Although it is not clear what Justice Douglas
meant by "family values" and "youth values," it is clear that such values are
not shared by the entire population, especially if his remarks were at all
directed toward the values generally associated with the traditional nuclear
family. While "quiet seclusion" and "clean air" are arguably valued more
universally, some persons wishing to live in the community may value
other things-presently incompatible with quiet seclusion and clean air-
even more highly. Thus, some people wishing to live in Belle Terre or
similar communities because of proximity to a university or place of work
might not accept the values around which that community's land use has
been designed. Under the Belle Terre decision, they have no constitutional
complaint.
Because of the brevity of the Belle Terre opinion, it is difficult to derive
more from it than the proposition that very small communities may limit
land use to modes designed exclusively for the preservation of "family
needs," and may do so to the exclusion of those whose needs (or desires)
are not familial. However, even such a narrow reading would seem to
establish the legitimacy of reserving at least a small portion of land within
any community to meet the peculiar needs of only a portion of the
populace, even if the "needs" are largely psychological or emotional.
Whether this reasoning can be extended to permit a municipality to zone a
portion of its land to meet the "needs" of those whose psychological well-
being is detrimentally affected by the presence of children is obviously
another matter, and one that is explored in the next sections of the article.8 9
B. Moore v. City of East Cleveland
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Moore
v. City of East Cleveland,9" which has significant implications for age-
restrictive housing. The case concerned a housing ordinance applicable
throughout the entire city of East Cleveland, Ohio, that limited occupancy
of dwellings to members of a single family and made violation a criminal
offense. The complex definition of "family" excluded certain extended
88. Id. at 9.
89. See text accompanying notes 102-49 infra. This is not to suggest that psychological well-
being is the only interest which may be served by age-exclusive housing. As will be examined later, there
are also arguments that age-restrictive housing may enhance the physical safety and comfort of the
resident population and may also be in their financial interest. Whethersuch interestscan befurthered
consistent with thegeneral welfare, however, is problematic. See text accompanying notes 164-66 infra.
The reason that I have concentrated on social and psychological benefits is that theyare likely to be the
most questionable in terms of their legitimacy as a state interest.
90. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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family arrangements, such as two children, related as first cousins but not
as brothers living with their grandmother-the defendant's situation. The
grandmother was told by local authorities that she would have to leave the
city or face criminal prosecution. When she refused to leave she was
prosecuted, and her conviction was upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court.
She then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Justice Powell wrote the opinion for a plurality of the Court, in which
three other Justices joined. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurrence,
and four Justices dissented. Justice Powell began the opinion by
immediately distinguishing Belle Terre, stating that Belle Terre had the
effect of excluding only unrelated individuals. East Cleveland, in contrast,
by making a grandmother's choice to live with her grandson a crime, had
"chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply into the
family itself."'" Citing a "host of cases, 9 2 he stated that when the
government undertakes intrusive regulation of the family, "the Court must
examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulations. 93
The city sought to justify the ordinance as a means of preventing
overcrowding, minimizing traffic congestion, and avoiding financial
burden on the school system-purposes that Justice Powell characterized
as legitimate. 94 He then demonstrated, however, the gross under- and
over-inclusiveness of the ordinance95 and concluded that the ordinance
had only a "tenuous" relationship to the conditions it sought to alleviate,
serving them "marginally, at best. '96 In the final portion of the opinion he
justified the application of a stringent substantive due process review97 by
including the extended family among the beneficiaries of the constitutional
protection accorded to marriage, family, and procreation: "Ours is by no
means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of
the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has
roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional
recognition."" After reciting some of the potential values inherent in the
91. Id. at 498.
92. Id. Justice Powell discussed none of the 13 cases cited in detail.
93. 431 U.S. at 499.
94. Id. at 500.
95.
For example, the ordinance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmar-
ried children to live together, even if the family contains a half dozen licensed drivers, each
with his or her own car. At the same time it forbids an adult brother and sister to share a
household, even if both faithfully use public transportation.
431 U.S. at 500.
96. Id.
97. In order to withstand constitutional attack, all state regulatory action must have a rational
connection to a legitimate state interest. In other words, the purpose of the regulation must be a
legitimate one and the legislation must serve to accomplish the purpose in at least one conceivable case.
The test applied in Moore, however, was much more exacting than this minimum. See431 U.S. at 499.
98. Id. at 504.
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extended family, he concluded that "the Constitution prevents East
Cleveland from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all
to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."99
This case has been read by' Professor Doyle to sound the death knell
for age-restrictive housing, at least where age homogeneity is
accomplished through the use of zoning, or similar municipal powers.,t°
While the case does establish some limitations upon the establishment of
age-restrictive housing through the use of such powers, I believe that
Professor Doyle reads the case, and those cases used by the Court to
support its holding, too broadly. While I could begin by discussing the
obvious factual distinctions between the Moore case and, for example, an
ordinance that establishes a district as an "adult community" where
occupancy by children was not permitted, such a discussion is best
accomplished within the context of the methodology employed by the
Supreme Court and other federal courts when claimants assert that actions
of the state impinge upon their substantive due process rights. In this
context, significant constitutional distinctions exist between the Moore
ordinance and "adult community" zoning in which a municipality sets
aside a small portion of its land for "child-free" living and, in so doing, does
not substantially diminish the housing opportunities for families with
children within the community at large.
IV. THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD
The express basis for the decision of the Court in Moore was the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, not the ninth amendment nor
"penumbras" of one or more of the amendments.10 2 It acknowledged
explicitly the right asserted as one protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty. In examining the due process standard
employed by the Court, it is significant that in only one case 0 3 relied upon
in Moore has the Court clearly applied a "two-tier" method of due process
analysis simliar to that utilized in equal protection cases, and required that
an infringement upon a fundamental interest protected by the due process
clause be supported by a compelling state interest and be the least
restrictive alternative.'0 4 Perhaps recognizing that the interests protected
under that clause do not lend themselves to easy definition, 05 the Court
99. Id. at 506.
100. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 97.
101. Professor Doyle feels that age homogeneity may be accomplished through the use of
restrictive covenants running with the land, since she does not believe that the requisite state action is
present for the invocation of constitutional guarantees. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 105.1 disagree to
some extent with this conclusion. See text accompanying notes 194-230 infra.
102. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
103.. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Id. at 155.
105. See text accompanying notes 130-32 infra.
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has adopted, both in word10 6 and practice, a much more flexible approach
than its asserted mode of analysis in the equal protection cases. Like the
expansive language of the clause itself, interests such as marital privacy,
procreation, and the right to travel are themselves expansive concepts, and
it is difficult to conceive of a governmental action that does not affect them
in some way. Rather, interests bound up in the fourteenth amendment's
concept of individual liberty are far more amenable to an approach that
incorporates the various manifestations of these interests and the
numerous ways in which government action can infringe upon them.
While the Court has never explained in detail its methodology in deciding
substantive due process cases, its approach is, for lack of a better phrase, a
"balancing test,"' 07 involving far more subtle determinations than the
seemingly more mechanical "two-tier" approach of equal protection
analysis.10
8
The genesis of this approach is the definition of the liberty interest
protected by the fourteenth amendment, as set out in Meyer v.
Nebraska:1 09
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed . . . it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children," to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 0
In short, the right protected in Meyer is the right to go about one's life
without undue interference by the state. Given this description of the
liberty interest protected, it is hardly surprising that the mechanism by
which these interests are protected must exhibit significant flexibility, and,
in fact, the language of the cases themselves generally suggest this
flexibility. "1 Justice Powell's recitation of the appropriate test in Moore is
not couched in language of the equal protection cases, 1 2 but rather in
language suggesting a more subtle approach. t1 3
106. The Court, however, has never disavowed the language of Roe or the test applied in that
case.
107. But see Perry, supra note 61, at 420-21.
108. It is, of course, somewhat misleading to characterize the Court's mode of analysis in equal
protection cases as either "mechanical" or rigidly "two-tiered." Especially in the area of sex
discrimination, the approach of the Court can no longer be described as dichotomous. See, e.g., Orrv.
Orr, 47 U.S.L.W. 4224,4227 (March 5, 1979); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also note 112 Infra.
109. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
110. Id. at 399.
I11. But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
112. In a sense, almost all legislation establishes classifications. Therefore, a claim that
legislation violates substantive due process rights is probably translatable into the rhetoric of equal
protection. For example, the plaintiff in Moore could have argued that the ordinance in that case
established a classification based upon family relationship and treated the respective classes differently.
Since such a classification impinged upon a fundamental right, the Court should adopt the rigorous
"strict scrutiny" approach. Perhaps this interchangeability is why the Court has adopted, to some
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Perhaps the most explicit use of the balancing approach came in the
case of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. 14 In that case the
Court considered the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and
Material Preservation Act, 1 s which gave custody of the Nixon tapes to the
Administrator of the General Services Administration. In disposing of the
claim that the Act unconstitutionally invaded the former President's right
to privacy,' 6 the Court acknowledged that Nixon did have a con-
stitutionally protected privacy interest in the tapes. The court then stated:
But the merit of appellant's claim of invasion of his privacy cannot be
considered in the abstract; rather, the claim must be considered in light of the
specific provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be weighed against the
public interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's
administration to archival screening.'
7
There are other examples in recent opinions of the Court, and its
individual Justices, of the nature of the test used to determine whether a
state action interferes with substantive due process rights.1 s More
important, however, is the recognition that, given the nature of the
interests to be protected, a flexible approach by the Court is necessary to
avoid imposing unacceptable constraints on the political process. That is, a
rigid "two-tier" analysis would first require a decision whether an asserted
interest was entitled to stringent or minimal substantive due process
protection. Presumably, this would be determined without considering
any factors other than the nature of the interest itself.' 9 Assuming the
interest was entitled to stringent due process protection, the state would be
extentsub silentio, a flexible approach to equal protection cases as well. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter,405
U.S. 134(1972); Reed. v. Reed,404 U.S. 71(1971). Seealso Regents of the Univ. ofCalif. v. Bakke,438
U.S. 265,324 (1978)( Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,JJ., concurring and dissenting). Fora
more complete discussion of the interchangeable nature of the equal protection and substantive due
process concepts, see Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting
Fundamental and Not-So Fundamental "Rights" 7hrough a Flexible Conception of Equal Protection,
1977 DUKE L. J. 143, 162-63.
113. "But when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this
Court must examine carefully the importance of thegovernmental interests advanced and the extent to
which they are served by the challenged regulation." 431 U.S. at 499.
114. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
115. Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976)).
116. While the right to privacy was not discussed in the context of the fourteenth amendment
due process guarantee in the Nixon case, the reliance of the Court on Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589
(1977), makes it clear that the privacy right in the case has its genesis in the fourteenth amendment. See
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 589, 598-99 n.23 (1977).
117. 433 U.S. at 458. See also Plante v. Gonzalez, 437 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Fla. 1977), afJ'd, 575
F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the court relied upon the Nixon case to expressly adopt a balancing
test with respect to the infringement by the government upon the privacy interest.
118. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 547-48 (1977) (White, J., dissenting);
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974).
119. Under the "two-tier" analysis, the determination whether the right involved is
"fundamental" functions as a condition precedent to the application of the appropriate level of
scrutiny, rather than as a part of the test of constitutional validity itself.
120. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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put to the virtually impossible 20 task of demonstrating the furtherance of a
compelling state interest and the use of the least restrictive alternative. On
the other hand, if recognition of the interest as "fundamental" under the
Constitution was not forthcoming, the state would only have to meet the
burden of showing that the action furthered some conceivable state
interest, regardless of the degree of infringement, the weakness of the
governmental interest asserted (as long as the Court was willing to concede
that the interest was "legitimate"), or the gross under- or over-inclusiveness
of the swath cut by the statute. Otherwise, if such factors were considered
in determining the protection to which the interest was entitled, a
balancing would occur sub silentio. 121 Under such a rigid "two-tier"
approach the Court has two alternatives. It can say that a particular
interest, e.g., the right to wear one's hair at any length, enjoys
constitutional protection as a fundamental right, in all circumstances and
under all conditions (since the sole focus of the Court at this stage of the
analysis is on the interest itself); or, it can decide that the state may legislate
hair length to any degree it chooses, regardless of the number of persons
affected, as long as it can demonstrate that, at least in some circumstances,
it serves a legitimate governmental interest, perhaps even an aesthetic
one.' 22 Such a result would be intolerable, and obviously has not occurred
in the cases. 123
What has occurred is that all the factors mentioned above have been
weighed in the decisional process. When the courts have purported to use a
"two-tier" analysis, these factors have been considered in determining
whether the interest abridged by the state action constituted a fundamental
right. Thus, courts have inquired whether a "serious" abridgement has
occurred,124 whether the infringement was "incidental" or "direct,"1 25 and
whether the state action constituted a "penalty."'126 All these issues are, of
121. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,419 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (application ofan ad
hoc balancing test in equal protection case criticized).
122. Cf. Village ofBelleTerrev. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,9(1974) (protection of the"blessings of quiet
seclusion").
123. But cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238(1976). In Kelley, the Court accepted the contention
of the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department that hair length regulations furthered
the legitimate state interest of esprit de corps within the department, even though it was the president of
the policemen's union in his official capacity who challenged the regulations. 425 U.S. at 254-55
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, it is clear that the Court will not require much in the way of state
justification when it views the interests to be protected as "minor."
124. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1974). See also 11 awes v.
Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 535 F.2d 140 (1 st Cir. 1976); Prostrollo v. University of S.D., 507 F,2d
775 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Prostrollo v. Bowen, 421 U.S. 952 (1975).
125. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977) (result of ordinance not
"incidental"). Cf. Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. MeGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961)
(incidental effect on first amendment rights upheld). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632, 652 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Cervantes v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 510
F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1975); Robles v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 485 F.2d 100, 102 (10th Cir.
1973). But see Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist. 612, 509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 833 (1975); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal, Rptr. 94 (1975).
126. Compare Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) with Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 652 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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course, logically unrelated to the question whether an interest is in the first
instance a fundamental right deserving heightened constitutional protec-
tion.12
7
Similarly, the issue of the over- or under-inclusiveness of the statute
would generally deserve little discussion, assuming the actual existence of a
rigid "two-tier" methodology. Either the statute must "fit like a glove" (if
the more onerous test is applicable) or else it must only further a legitimate
state interest in at least one conceivable ease. In reality, however, this
factor has been utilized in a more subtle manner, and the extent to which
the Court requires a "close fit" seems to be closely related to the nature and
degree of infringement and the nature of the right asserted.12 8
While the Court has been applying a balancing approach in
substantive due process cases, and has even seemed to recognize its
analysis as such in some cases, 129 it has not moved completely from the
dichotomy of fundamental/ non-fundamental rights as a "triggering"
concept.130  Consequently, confusion has resulted regarding the
methodology actually being employed in a particular case and to be
employed in future cases. Should the Court recognize the fundamental
nature of the substantive due process test as a balancing process of
numerous factors, and delineate those factors it feels are critical to any
substantive due process inquiry, the result would be a significant doctrinal
improvement over the present process, which seems to recognize and
utilize a balancing process without revealing, as best it can, the nature of
the balance. To those who might object that this would, in effect, grant the
Court carte blanche to invalidate state legislation, it need only be said that
the Court already has that power, both in terms of its constitutional
prerogatives and in terms of the present methodology actually utilized.
Presently, if the Court finds that the interest asserted is within the
protection of such encompassing terms as, for example, the right to
privacy or the right to "raise a family," the legislation rarely, if ever,
survives. Yet as a definitional matter, it is hard to argue with any decision
of the Court either placing or refusing to place an asserted interest within
the scope of such terms, since their definitional scope is difficult to describe
and subject to disagreement. If the argument is whether the particular
interest is sufficiently important to come within the ambit of these terms,
their invocation in the decisional process merely confuses the issue. It is no
different, and much clearer from an analytical viewpoint, to inquire
whether the specific interest infringed upon is sufficiently important to be
considered a protected "liberty" under the fourteenth amendment.
Therefore, it should be explicitly recognized by the Court that any state
infringement upon a person's right to do as he pleases presents a potential
127. See note 119 supra.
128. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 n.7 (1977).
129. See text accompanying notes 11418 supra.
130. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502-05 (1977).
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due process question. This would free the Court to consider all the factors
it now considers on a somewhat ad hoc basis in a manner that will have
continuity from case to case.
Notwithstanding the dlarity that an explicit balancing test with an
express enumeration of relevant factors to be included in the process might
bring, it is sufficient for purposes of this article to have established that at
least some kind of balancing operation, more sophisticated certainly than
the process elucidated in Roe v. Wade,' is occurring, and to have
established some of the factors that the Court considers in the process. 132
When viewed in this perspective, it is easier to understand the result in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland and to predict the response of the Court to
various other situations concerning age-restrictive housing established by
zoning ordinances. Moore dealt with the direct determination by the state
of the relative legitimacy (or at least desirability) of alternative family
relationships. The ordinance was applicable throughout the entire city,
and therefore no claim could be made that the state was merely recognizing
differences in familial relationships and seeking to accommodate them
without indicating a preference. Further, the specific individual interest
asserted was an important interest, both to the particular claimant and
when viewed from broader historical and socioeconomic perspectives. In
addition, though the interests asserted by the state were "legitimate," they
were astonishingly ill-served by the challenged ordinance, to such an
extent that Justice Stevens, in a separate concurrence, determined that the
ordinance could not even withstand the most limited standard of due
process review requiring a means reasonably related to the ends sought to
be achieved. 3 3 Given the nature of the interest asserted, it is hardly
131. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See text accompanying note 103 supra.
132. Although a full discussion of possible objections to the adoption by the Court of a more
explicit balancing test is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to deal briefly with the most
obvious one.
It has been suggested that an explicit balancing test would lack the clarity of a "two-ticlr"
approach: that is, one would have no way of predicting the balance the Court would strike in it
particular case. There are a number of responses to this. First, even under an explicit balancing test,
there is no reason why the recent tradition of non-interference with social and economic legislation
should not continue. The legitimacy of governmental action in these areas i:; no longer questioned, and
the importance of the economic well-being of society is clearly an important state interest. In addition,
it is this type of legislation that courts are least equipped to evaluate, and, therefore, it is in these cases
that the presumption of validity should be the strongest.
Second, a specific delineation of the factors that the Court considers important for purposes of
constitutional due process analysis would assist in the prior evaluation of a claim. In addition, the
mode of analysis in weighing the relevant factors would become increasingly well-defined as specific
cases were decided. See Yarbrough, supra note 112, at 163.
Finally, the short answer is that uncertainty clearly exists now, although its focus is perhaps
somewhat different than that which may be created by an explicit balancing test. The uncertainty
regarding how the Court will define the asserted right, that is, narrowly or broadly, may be crucial in
determining whether the right will be viewed to be "fundamental." See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 325 (1971). As pointed out in the text, the Court has already adopted some kind of balancing
process, thus leading to substantial uncertainty at present.
133. 431 U.S. at 520 (Stevens, J., concurring). It is possible, in view of the ill-devised nature of
the ordinance, that but for the existence of the Belle Terre case, the full Court would have invalidated
the ordinance under this standard. The ordinance in Belle Terre, however, was probably no better
suited to its purposes than the ordinance in Moore, and, as a result, the Court could not invalidate it on
the basis of the rational relationship test.
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surprising that, the Court invalidated a state action that so significantly
intruded upon a person's liberty while accomplishing so little. Had the
Court not been encumbered by the "fundamental/non-fundamental"
dichotomy of Roe v. Wade, Justice Stewart would not have been placed in
the difficult position of deciding whether the right to live with one's
grandchildren was a "fundamental" one.134 Rather, the Court could have
recognized the interest as an important one, which it clearly is,
acknowledged the danger of direct state determination of the relative
desirability of family arrangements, and indicated that the ordinance,
while accomplishing little, caused substantial unnecessary hardship by its
over-inclusiveness. Under such an analysis, despite a strong presumption
of legislative validity which should still be accorded the state in the context
of an explicitly recognized due process balancing test, 135 the ordinance
would have failed.
In the context of a due process analysis such as the one outlined
above, the constitutional differences between a case such as Moore and
cases such as Weymouth become clear. The establishment of age-
restrictive communities is not a direct statement by the state of which
family relationships are preferable, especially when the restricted area
represents only a small portion of the community. Instead, it is simply a
recognition that some of its citizens prefer certain family relationships and
an attempt to accommodate their desires and needs. The effect of the state
action on family relationships is arguably an "indirect" one, 36 defining
occupants not by the closeness of the relationship, but by the age of the
occupant. 137 The size of the restricted area is also important for reasons
other than the necessary implication of state preference which arises when
such restrictions are applicable throughout an entire community. It serves
in part to define the degree of interference with the asserted right of the
excludee to raise his or her family in a particular area. Obviously, it is a
substantially lesser infringement to be denied access to a ninety-six acre
parcel than to be denied access to an entire city. 38 In all the zoning cases in
134. See, e.g., Moorev. City of East Cleveland,431 U.S.494,537(1977) (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
135. This presumption should remain the strongest in those cases where courts are least
equipped to balance the competing interests. While these have been described as "business, economic,
and social affairs," see Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), such categorization
language is probably overbroad. It is probably safe to say, however, that legitimately debatable policy
decisions in areas requiring the application of technical expertise to empirical data should enjoy a very
strong presumption of validity.
136. See cases cited in and text accompanying note 125 supra.
137. Of course, the nature ofthe particular restriction will be relevant to this inquiry. Certainly it
is unlikely that many grandchildren will be living with grandparents if there is an absolute bar on
persons under55 years of age. Thus, the restriction would have essentially the same effect as explicitly
barring grandchildren from residing with their grandparents, and this effect cannot meaningfully be
termed "incidentaL" This would not be true, however, if the minimum age were 12.
138. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 550 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
Professor Doyle views as "unpersuasive" any distinction based upon whether the municipality has
chosen to adopt age restrictions applicable throughout the entire municipality or only a portion of it.
She believes that such a distinction would lead to the anomalous result in which a large subdivision
might be validly designated as age-restrictive while a town of smaller size might not. Doyle,supra note
10, at 95 n.125.
I am not convinced by her argument. While such"anomalies" maybecreated, theyare inherent in
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which restrictions were upheld, the courts, albeit for purposes of state law,
emphasized that the challenged ordinance had little or no effect upon the
availability of housing within the community as a whole. 1 believe this to
have significance for purposes of federal constitutional law as a potential
indicator of the degree of state infringement. In practical terms, by
focusing on the issue of whether the entire community is age-restrictive, or
only a small portion of it, and refusing to permit an entire community to be
age-restrictive, the Court can prevent a "snowballing" effect; that is, while
a small exclusively age-restrictive community may not be unreasonably
intrusive, since there are feasible housing opportunities for excludees in
easily accessible surrounding communities, the cumulative effect, if each
community would adopt such restrictions, would be gravely intrusive.1
39
The relative strength of the state interests asserted in Moore and those
asserted by a state establishing age restrictions may vary considerably. An
ordinance that establishes a restricted area for low-income elderly when it
is demonstrated that there are significant numbers of such people in the
community in need of housing may be entitled to substantially more
weight than the state interests asserted in Moore. 140 Additionally, the gross
over- and under-inclusiveness of the ordinance in Moore may or may
not be present in an age-restricted district, and is especially unlikely to be
present within the context of a retirement comnmunity. Finally, the
correlation between children and the types of activities that the elderly (or
at least a substantial portion of them) find psychologically disruptive must
be high. 14' Thus, there is much of constitutional dimension to distinguish
the establishment of a retirement community from the ordinance
invalidated in Moore. 142
the legitimacy of local zoning. Certainly the right to live with one's family is not so fundamental that it
encompasses the right to live in a particular neighborhood or portion ofa municipality. Otherwise, It is
unlikely that the Court would permit thejustifications for traditional zoning, which may act to exclude
people from particular segments of a town, to interfere with such a right. Therefore, as long as the result
reached as a result of such "anomalies" is not entirely unreasonable, it should generally be sufficient to
uphold the ordinance if only asmall portion of the municipality is age-restrictive. And if the result is
totally unreasonable, it should be struck down under the balancing test discussed in the text. It should
also be mentioned that the courts that have invalidated exclusionary zoning practices have not required
that the municipality dispense with all differences in residential classifications, thereby permitting a
person to live with his or her family any place he chooses; rather, the courts have required that a
municipality provide its "fair share" of regional needs. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
139. The Court could also consider the geographic jurisdiction of the zoning authority in
relation to the area affected by the restrictions as a factor to be weighed in the balance. See note 138
supra.
140. While it might be argued that the state can meet the needs of such people by establishing
sufficient low income housing to meet the needs of all age groups on an age-neutral basis, it may be that
the needs of the elderly poor differ from those of other poor people in such a way that they can only be
met by age-restrictive housing. See text accompanying notes 150-66 infra.
141. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 97 n.127.
142. It is also significant that the opinion of Justice Powell in Moore represented only a plurality
of the Court. Justice Stevens found the ordinance wanting under the standard of review traditionally
applicable to zoning cases. 431 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring). Therefore, it is highly problematic




It should again be emphasized that, while it is suggested by the author
that the Court be more explicit in its use of a balancing approach to
questions of substantive due process, the importance of the balancing
process to the present inquiry is not that it should be used by the Court, but
rather that it constitutes the present methodology of the Court. The Court
has undertaken to evaluate the relative importance of various state
interests, 143 and to consider in the decisional process the degree1 44 and
"directness"'145 of the infringement. It has also considered the extent to
which a legislative action is under- or over-inclusive beyond that which is
necessary to satisfy a "two-tier" approach. 146 In some cases it has
attempted to fit a consideration of these factors into the dichotomy of
fundamental versus non-fundamental rights, admittedly a'difficult
proposition. 47 At other times, it has merely discussed them without
indicating the theoretical basis for their significance, 48 and in still other
cases the language of the Court expressly admits of some balancing
process. 49 Viewed in this way, while Moore indicates that the Court
regards the ability of a person to determine his or her appropriate family
relationship without suffering the "penalty" of being required to live
elsewhere as ai important interest, it certainly does not mandate the
invalidation of all age-restrictive housing, even when accomplished
pursuant to direct state action, such as use of the zoning power.
V. THE GENERAL WELFARE QUESTION
The police power of the states is limited to those actions bearing a real
and substantial relationship to the general welfare. 50 This limitation on
the use of governmental power has its foundation in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, and is essentially the equivalent of the eq1ual
protection notion that a statute must serve a legitimate state interest.' It
has been adequately demonstrated in a prior section of this article'52 that a
govermental action can be directed at satisfying the needs of only a portion
of the governed population, even if such needs are primarily social or
psychological, and still meet the "general welfare" standard of the
143. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977). Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971) (equal protection case).
144. See cases cited in note 124 supra.
145. See cases cited in note 125 supra.
146. See note 128 and accompanying text supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 130-32 supra.
148. Cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,498 (1977) (theoretical significance of
whether effect was incidental or not was not discussed).
149. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
150. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). The "general welfare" or 'public welfare"
limitation to the police power has been developed at some length by Professor Perry in Abortion, the
Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 689, 693-707 (1976).
151. See Perry, supra note 150, at 706 n.83.
152. See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
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Constitution. A further factual inquiry, however, remains. First, assuming
that a statute is not automatically unconstitutional merely because it seeks
to satisfy the needs of only a portion of the population, whether the
legislature has made a plausible factual determination that the statute will
accomplish its purpose, that is, to satisfy these needs. Second, even
assuming it accomplishes its purpose in some individual cases, whether the
societal costs are so substantial and the benefits to the affected group so
meager that it is implausible to believe that the statute bears a real and
substantial relationship to the general well-being of the society.
1 53
The literature on the effect of age-homogeneous living deals almost
entirely with retirement communities, or similar environments in which
"senior citizens" constitute the relevant age-homogeneous group. While
there is some debate concerning whether such age homogeneity is
beneficial to the residents of such communities, it is fair to say that most of
the literature has concluded that there are significant psychological, social,
and economic benefits that result from the age-restrictive nature of the
community. 54 A number of studies have revealed that morale among
persons in retirement communities is generally higher than among those in
age-integrated communities, even when other socioeconomic facters are
controlled.155 While this may be partially a result of self-selection, 156 at
least a portion of the result has been accorded to the age homogeneity of
the environment. The same studies have demonstrated that retirement
communities actually facilitate the level of social interaction among the
residents. There are large numbers of potential replacements for friends
153. This second inquiry, of course, involves a balancing of some of the same considerations
discussed in connection with the question whether a particular statute can ultimately survive a
substantive due process challenge. See text accompanying notes 102-49 supra. However, satisfaction of
a standard that asks whether there is some factual basis for the legislative decision that the statute will
serve the general welfare does not guarantee that the statute will pass substantive due process muster,
Rather, this is a threshold inquiry much the same as the initial inquiry in equal protection cases that
seeks to determine if the statute plausibly serves a legitimate state interest. If this threshold test is not
satisfied, the inquiry proceeds no further and the statute is invalidated. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
It is possible, however, to merge the threshold inquiry and the "second level" test of ultimate
legitimacy merely be assuming that a statute which substantially interferes with an important
individual interest can never bear a real and substantial relationship to the general welfare. It is,
however, possible to conceive of statutes that would only affect a small number of people on infrequent
occasions, but would, on those occasions, result in a profound intrusion into a vital individual interest,
Such a statute might result in significant benefits to the general populace and enjoy the support of a
large majority of affected persons, but still be invalid under the fourteenth amendment, In such a
situation it would be plausible to say that the statute satisfies the threshold test of a real and substantial
relationship to the general welfare, and is still invalid under the due process clause. Cf. Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972) (only state interests of the highest ordercan overbalance legitimate
claims to free exercise of religion). But see Perry, supra note 61, at 420-21.
Regardless of the methodology adopted in resolving substantive due process questions, the
discussion in this section is relevant to a resolution of the problem.
154. See, e.g., Sherman, Mangum, Dodds, Walkley & Wilner, Psychological Effects of
Retirement Housing, 8 GERONTOLOGIST 170 (1968); see also, Doyle, supra note 10, at 82 n75 and
authorities cited therein.





lost late in life through death, migration, or ill health,157 and such
communities are often designed in other ways to encourage social contact.
In addition, age homogeneity facilitates the development of a normative
system peculiarly suited to the needs of the older citizen. The conflict often
experienced by older persons between the instrumental, or "work ethic,"
values of their youth and of the younger persons around them, and the
more relaxed, leisure-oriented values that many older persons seek may be
mitigated by age homogeneity. 58 In a sense, the age homogeneity serves as
a buffer against conflicts caused by the role expectations of a younger
general population. 59 Further, there is evidence that older persons in an
age-concentrated environment hold more liberal or permissive attitudes
toward the behavior of their age-peers that do those of comparable status
residing in their hometowns in age-integrated eommunities. 6°
Thus, there is a very strong case to be made that age-homogeneous
environments designed exclusively for retirees (or those of retirement age)
meet the needs of their residents very well. In addition, both the number of
older persons in the population at large and the number attracted to age-
homogeneous communities is very substantial and growing rapidly.
According to 1977 data there were almost forty-four million people in the
United States aged fifty-five or older, a full twenty percent of the popula-
tion.' 61 In addition, age-homogeneous communities, not only in the "sun
belt" but in the metropolitan northeast, are virtually exploding with new-
comers.162 Thus, there is substantial evidence that age-homogeneous com-
munities serve well the needs of those presently residing there in ways that
age-integrated housing cannot, and that the number of persons having
such needs represent a large segment of our population. It would seem
clear that governmental action directed at meeting the acknowledged
needs of a large portion of the population is in furtherance of the general
welfare, absent some very strong countervailing considerations.,63
Aside from serving the social and psychological needs of those of
retirement age, age-restrictive housing may serve other needs as well.
Statistics show that a disproportionate number of victims of violent crime,
such as assault and robbery, are older persons, and that a disproportionate
share of such crimes are committed by adolescents and adults in their early
157. Id. at 213. There is evidence that friendships or social contacts would not result if the
replacement pool were younger in age. Id. at 210.
168. See Messer, The Possibility of an Age-Concentrated Environment Becominga Normative
System, 7 GERONTOLOGIST 247, 250 (1967).
159. Id.
160. Bultena & Wood, supra note 155, at 213.
161. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OFTItE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACIOFTiIE
UNITED STATES 1978, at 29, Table 29 (99th ed. 1978).
162. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 64.
163. Whether a particular action is constitutionally permissible, however, is a different issue.
While there may exist legitimate state interests that can be served by age-restrictive housing, this does
not validate per se all age-restrictive actions.
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twenties. 64 Decreasing the physical propinquity between the two age
groups may serve to decrease the peculiar susceptibility of older citizens to
violent crime, and perhaps even decrease the amount of such crime in
absolute terms. 165 Thus, the age group that is least well-equipped to deal
with the economic and physical consequences of violent crime may have
the incidence of such crime among their age group diminished by age-
homogeneous housing, thus providing an additional justification for it.
Finally, age-restrictive housing for retirees, and perhaps generally,
may serve the political value of freedom of association that is surely
connected with the general welfare. Constitutional validation of age-
restrictive communities would neither mandate their creation nor require
anyone to live within their confines. Presumably, a citizen would have the
choice of living in an age-integrated or age-homogeneous environment, a
choice that may not be possible unless age restrictions could be established
or at least enforced by the state. If it is assumed that a significant number of
people would remain in age-integrated environments, it is unlikely that the
associational opportunities of other segments of the population would be
seriously affected.
66
While substantial authority exists that significant benefits may accrue
as a result of age-restrictive housing for those of retirement age, there has
also been commentary which asserts that these communities are
detrimental both to their residents and to the community at-large.
Retirement communities have been criticized for their emphasis on leisure
and the lack of purpose that such an emphasis engenders. One
commentator has referred to them as "nurseries of second childhood,"'
167
and has criticized the fact that many people in these communities feel
unconstrained by the social laws and expectations of the larger society,
leading to an "impoverishment of personality."'
' 68
While such criticism probably represents a minority view in the
literature, 169 it strikes at the heart of the legitimacy of age-restrictive
housing, at least with respect to this age group, because it asserts that age-
restrictiveness is not even beneficial to the group it purports to serve apart
from any failure to in some way serve the larger society. While such
164. In 1976, approximately 30% of all robberies and 45.6% of all larcenies were committed by
persons under 18. Persons under 18 were generally responsible for 42.8% of all serious crime. U.S,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIlE UNITED STATES
1977, at 177, Table 294 (98th ed. 1977). Concerning the particular susceptibility of older persons to
serious crime, see Gubrium, Victimization in Old Age, 20 CRIME AND )ELINQUENCY 245 (1974).
165. Since older citizens present targets for crime who are particularly vulnerable and least likely
to successfully defend themselves, there is probably some portion of the criminal population that
would choose not to commit such crimes at all, or perhaps less of them, if the only readily available
targets were younger people more likely to be able to successfully defend themselves and their property,
166. If younger persons believe that there are benefits to be gained from association with older
persons, there will certainly be sufficient numbers desiring to live in the age-integrated society at-large
to afford such opportunities. Thus, the associational opportunities of one segment of the population
can be significantly enhanced without meaningful detriment to other scegments.
167. D. JONAS & D. JONAS, YOUNG TILL WE DIE 155 (1973).
168. Id. at 154.
169. See Buletena & Wood, supra note 155, at 210.
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criticism presents a serious potential problem to upholding age-restrictive
housing, it must be said that this view is not accepted by much of the older
population itself. In fact, it is precisely this attitude of the younger segment
of the population-that they know what is best for older citizens-that
infuriates many of the latter, and in part, influences their decision to live in
an environment of age homogeneity. Many retirees feel that they have
earned the right through many years of hard labor to spend the remaining
years of their life in what other, younger members of society may view as a
"purposeless" fashion.170 They view it as outrageously presumptuous for
sociologists and psychologists to tell them that this attitude is somehow
improper. For them, a release from the social laws of the society at large is
not personality impoverishment, but long awaited freedom. Some feel that
the values of responsibility and contribution are unnecessary among a
group that has already contributed and has earned the right to be free of
responsibility.1
7 1
Age-restrictive housing for those of retirement age has, however, been
criticized on grounds that admit that some benefit accrues to those
permitted to live in such communities, but deny that such practices serve
the general welfare. It has been asserted that widespread age-districting
may result in less intergenerational contact with adverse consequences to
the society. Older persons would refuse involvement with the general
culture, thus depriving it of their wisdom and expertise, and young people
would be denied the opportunity to prepare for their own aging by
witnessing the aging process in others. 72 To the extent that the above
assertions are accurate, they do indicate that the benefits of age-segregated
housing may not be in the general interest, at least when it serves to
segregate those persons well into the aging process from the rest of the
society.
One can easily speculate, however, that neither of the-above condi-
tions would result even from substantial age-districting. First, it may logi-
cally be assumed that many who are eligible to live in age-homogeneous
surroundings will not choose to do so. Thus, there will be ample
opportunity for intergenerational contact as an instructional process to
teach adaptation to the aging phenomenon. Also, those older citizens
wishing to identify with and contribute to the culture at large would remain
able to do so, while the others would probably not do so even if age-
homogeneous living options were unavailable. This latter conclusion is
supported by studies which indicate that mere geographical propinquity of
older and younger persons is no assurance of meaningful intergenerational
interaction.173 In fact, forced intergenerational contact through a lack of
legal alternatives may actually serve to create, rather than lessen,
170. Id. at 214.
171. Id. See also Messer, supra note 158, at 250.
172. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 82 n.75.
173. Bultena & Wood, supra note 155, at 210.
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intergenerational hostility. 174 In a recent episode in Arizona a widow with
small children who moved into a community of retirees was harrassed,
received threatening letters from her neighbors, and had her home looted
as a result of the presence of her children in the community. 175 It can
certainly be argued that the attitude of many older persons is not one of
hostility toward children per se but of having to live with them in
continuous proximity, and that the attitude of older persons toward
children might be more receptive if they could interact with children on
their own terms.
Another possible criticism of age-restrictive housing is that enforced
segregation of any type is harmful to a society that fundamentally values
equality, at least equality of opportunity. Further, segregation becomes
even more distasteful when based upon immutable physical characteris-
tics, such as race. 176 While there may be some merit in such criticism, situa-
tions involving age-restrictive housing for retirees arc clearly distinguish-
able from racial segregation from a social, as well as a legal, 77 perspective.
First, in one sense, age is not immutable in the same way as race. One's
racial or ethnic heritage is a lifelong characteristic; one's age is always
changing. Most people in the United States now live past the age of fifty-
five, and therefore most people will someday not be in the class of
excludees, either as children, the parents of children, or as younger adults.
Second, exclusion as a result of one's age certainly does not carry the social
stigma that exclusion as a result of one's race has historically carried. After
all, children are excluded as a result of characteristics that are presumed to
be common to all children, as a normal part of the growth process, and
therefore there is no inference of inferiority. Rather, there is simply a
recognition that children as a class share certain temporary characteristics
undesirable to a portion of the population. It also seems that there is little
danger of the permanent psychological harm that might be suffered by
children subject to racial discrimination, especially since the children
subject to age discrimination may never know they have been the subjects
of discrimination at all.178 Finally, there is not the political spectre of the
oppression of a minority by a majority. Retirees, despite their growing
numbers, are still a substantial minority of the population. Age-segregated
housing looks more like a societal recognition that a particular segment of
the society has special needs that can only be met in a certain way, rather
than smacking of political repression. In all these respects, age segregation
in housing is sufficiently distinguishable from racial segregation to prevent
174. Id. at 214.
175. Elderly in Arizona Town Fight to Keep Children Out, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1976, at 35,
176. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
177. See text at note 65 supra.
178. Assuming that the age restriction excluded only children, and not young adults, and the
minimum age for occupancy was set relatively low, e.g., 12 years, it is readily conceivable that a child




its invalidation in all cases for failure to satisfy the "general welfare" test.
A final criticism directed as age-restrictive housing raises the question
whether any regulation depriving substantial segments of the population
of the opportunity to locate in the particular location of their choice can
serve the public welfare. A short answer to this, of course, is that such a
broad assertion would serve to invalidate all zoning which prevents certain
economic groups from locating in any neighborhood they please. While
much "snob" zoning has been invalidated as exclusionary,179 sufficient
valid power continues to exist to prevent large economic groups from
settling in the neighborhood of their choice. 80 While age-restrictiveness
can reach the point at which it becomes constitutionally invalid under the
balancing process outlined previously, 181 its exclusionary nature is clearly
not enough, in itself, to invalidate it in all cases as inimical to the general
welfare.
The above analysis is in the author's opinion sufficient to establish
that age-homogeneous housing for persons of retirement age is not per se
unconstitutional because it fails to serve the general welfare. Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas'82 provides concrete support for the proposition that
a regulatory action can be designed and implemented to meet the social
and psychological needs of only a portion of the population and still satisfy
the general welfare standard. There is strong evidence that certain needs of
a substantial part of the older segment of the population can only be met by
age-homogeneous housing and that such housing can be permitted
without substantial social cost to the remainder of society. Even if one
accepts that there are counter-arguments to these assertions, in arguable
cases a presumption of legislative validity should prevail, and the Court
should accept a legislative judgment that age-restrictive housing for
persons of retirement age may further the general welfare.
Obviously, most of the prior discussion deals with the validity of age-
homogeneous housing for persons of retirement age. The question
becomes much more difficult when other forms of age-restrictive housing
are considered. For example, an attempt to exclude children from an
apartment complex designed for "young singles" would be a much more
doubtful proposition. The presence and extent of peculiar needs on the
part of this age group that can only be met by age-restrictive housing is
much less clear, and the necessity of age-restrictive action on the part of the
state to meet these needs is less certain. I am not prepared to say, however,
that any state action enforcing or establishing such restrictions would be
contrary to the general welfare. 83 1 do think, however, that such measures
179. See, e.g., cases cited in note 6 supra.
180. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151,190-91,
336 A.2d 713, 733 (1975).
181. See text accompanying notes 10249 supra.
182. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
183. Determining the relative legitimacy of social and psychological needs is obviously a very
difficult proposition. If it could be shown that many "young singles" would be significantly happier in a
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would be less likely to satisfy the constitutional standards than age-
restrictive housing designed for retirees. Finally, I think that age-restrictive
housing that seeks to exclude older persons (e.g., fifty-five or older) would
be very unlikely to be deemed to advance the general welfare. It does
resemble the oppression of a minority by the younger majority and the
characteristic of old age is immutable-no one ever gets any younger. I
think such a situation is much closer to that of racial discrimination and
should be held not to satisfy the general welfare standard.
It should be reiterated that while I believe in certain instances age
discrimination in housing can serve the general welfare, I make no
assertion that it is constitutionally valid in all cases. Rather, such measures
simply could not be invalidated in all cases for failure to further the general
welfare. Instead, the Court would accept that at least ce rtain age-restrictive
measures, for example, those involving retirees, can function to further the
general welfare, thus satisfying the "threshhold test," and should then be
examined under the due process balancing process outlined in the previous
section of this article.' 84 This section has been intended merely to
demonstrate that a court should not decide in every case that age-
restrictive housing cannot be of sufficient social value to satisfy the general
welfare standard.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
OTHER EXCLUSIONARY DEVICES
A. Restrictive Covenants
Only one reported case has heretofore dealt with the permissibility of
establishing age-exclusive neighborhoods through the use of mutual
restrictive covenants. In Riley v. Stoves, the Court of Appeals of Arizona
was faced with a constitutional challenge to a restrictive covenant
applicable to a mobile home subdivision of thirty-nine lots. The covenant
restricted occupancy of any mobile home within the subdivision to persons
over twenty-one years of age,' 86 and it was admitted at trial that the
defendant lived on a lot within the subdivision with two children under
twenty-one.18 The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
enforcement of the covenant on equal protection grounds.
The court applied the less rigorous tier of equal protection analysis,
since the plaintiff, unaccountably, 88 did not assert that the enforcement of
the covenant would infringe upon a fundamental right. The court found
child-free environment, distinguishing them from those of retirement ag- might be a very difficult
proposition.
184. See text accompanying notes 102-49 supra.
185. 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974).
186. Id. at 225, 526 P. 2d 747 (1974).
187. Id.
188. It has been recognized that it is virtually impossible to invalidate legislation under the
rational basis tier of equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumst.ein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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little to distinguish the case from Belle Terre, stating that "it simply
involves a prohibition of certain combinations of persons living on a lot in
one portion of the subdivision."' 89 The court determined that the
restrictions were reasonably necessary to fulfill the legitimate need of older
buyers to be free from the noise and distractions caused by children, and
concluded that they did not violate the equal protection clause.
It should be apparent from the plaintiffs claims and the court's
discussion that the case was decided before Moore.'90 The court did,
however, mention two factors that distinguish it from Moore and would
suggest that the covenants would be enforced under the substantive due
process analysis discussed above.' 9 The court stated that "there was no
testimony as to any shortage of housing in the area or any desperate need
for housing which would accommodate families with children,"'192
distinguishing it from Molino. The court also mentioned that the
restriction only applied to a small portion of a subdivision, 93 which
presumably was itself only a small portion of the area subject to the zoning
authority. Both of these factors are important in determining the degree of
infringement upon the rights of the excludees and the suitability of the
means to accomplish the legitimate end of providing housing for that
portion of the population seeking to be free from the distractions of
children.
In the background of this case, however, lurks a potentially more far-
reaching issue than whether the restrictive covenant in this case would
satisfy the requirements of due process. The court in Riley simply assumed
the presence of state action in the court enforcement of the covenant,
relying upon Shelley v. Kraemer. 94 Shelley was the United States Supreme
Court case in which it was held that the enforcement by a state court of a
racially restrictive covenant, pursuant to the state's common law policy of
enforcing such agreements, constituted state action for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. 95 The theoretical foundation of Shelley, which
could serve to distinguish it from the vast array of situations in which states
are called upon to give legal sanction and enforcement to relationships
established by private action,196 was not clearly articulated in that case.
Subsequent attempts to formulate a limiting rationale, 97 while more or
189. 22 Ariz. App. at 229, 526 P.2d at 753.
190. Otherwise, it would be truly inconceivable why no claim to violation of fundamental rights
was made. Also, the language of the court cited in the text accompanying note 189 sipra would
probably not have been present after Moore.
191. See text accompanying notes 102-49 supra.
192. 22 Ariz. App. 228, 526 P.2d at 752.
193. Id.
194. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
195. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), firmly established the proposition that the
fourteenth amendment applies only to "state action" and not to private conduct.
196. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
197. See, e.g., Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer Notesfora Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. Ray,.473
(1962); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L REy. 1 (1959);
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less successful in a rhetorical sense and not inconsistent with the holding of
the case, have never been expressly adopted by the Court to limit Shelley.
Perhaps the most obvious distinguishing factor between Shelley and
Riley is that Shelley involved a racially restrictive covenant while Riley
involved an age-restrictive convenant. At first glance, while such a
distinction may be critical for purposes of determing the existence of a
substantive violation of the fourteenth amendment, it would seem
irrelevant to a determination of the presence or absence of state action. It
has been argued elsewhere, however, that this distinction is determinative
for the latter purpose as well,'"8 and the evolution of state action doctrine
generally lends substantial support, if not doctrinal satisfaction, to this
proposition.
Since Shelley, and particularly after the case of Reitman v. Mulkey, 99
the courts have been confronted with cases in which the state has been
called upon to enforce private actions taken pursuant to facially neutral
state statutes or common law policies which, if such actions were directly
undertaken by the state, would be clearly unconstitutional. Because of the
potential that Shelley and Reitman present for overruling the state action
requirement of the Civil Rights Cases,200 many courts have expressly
viewed cases involving racial discrimination as requiring a quantitatively
and qualitatively different involvement of the state than cases concerning
other constitutional prohibitions before the requisite state action will be
found.
The Second Circuit courts, in a multitude of cases,201 have stated that
a "double standard" of state action exists that is solely dependent upon
whether the alleged unconstitutional action involves racial discrimination.
Generally, the courts have merely stated this policy with no explanation,
while in other cases, including the case that seems to be the genesis of the
doctrine,2 °2 they have only briefly, and never in a fully satisfactory
manner, 203 articulated the basis for the distinction. Courts have relied
upon the fact that the fourteenth amendment was originally directed at
racial discrimination,20 4 that state power has been used more often to
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 (1959). See also Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 P11IL. & Pun. AFF. 107, 137,
141 (1976).
198. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 100, 104.
199. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
200. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
201. See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974); Grafton v.
Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150 (2d
Cir. 1971); United States v. Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1971); Powe v. Miles, 407 F,2d 73 (2d Cir,
1968); Girard v. 94th Street& Fifth Avenue Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Barrett v. United
Hospital, 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
202. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
203. See, e.g., the circular language in Jackson v. Statler Foundation. 496 F.2d 623,629 (2d Cir,
1974).
204. See Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 931 (Ist Cir. 1974);
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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foster racial discrimination than to deny other constitutional rights,205 and
that state inaction in the past has often been found to constitute affirmative
encouragement of racial discrimination.0 6 To conclude, however, from
these premises that there should be a difference in the requisite level of state
action to invoke fourteenth amendment protection seems to present a non
sequiter. While the substantive protection accorded by various constitu-
tional provisions may change depending upon the history of the provision,
and courts may be more wary in the fact-finding process in racial cases
since the state has more often sought to use its power to deny racial
equality than to deny other rights, there is no logical or historical reason
that, once the facts are ascertained, the state may involve itself more in
denying, for example, free speech rights than in racial discrimination. For
constitutional purposes, whether the state has a justification for acting is
an entirely different and severable question from whether it has acted at all.
While the nature of state action may differ depending upon the right being
denied, and thus be a legitimate basis for distinction, ° if the state is in-
volved in the same way and to the same degree in a non-racial case as in a
racial case, there seems to be no justification for saying that the state is
"acting" in one case and not "acting" in the other. Again, however, the
right at issue may be determinative of whether the action of the state,
assuming it is present, is constitutionally justified.
Despite the lack of satisfactory explanation, numerous other federal
courts have indicated that they view such a double standard as appro-
priate. The First,208 Fifth,20 9 Ninth,2 0 and District of Columbia 211 Circuits,
and the district courts in North Carolina, 212 Nebraska,2 3 and California2 4
have all expressly acknowledged the state action dichotomy. Therefore,
there would be substantial precedent upon which to argue that the pres-
ence of racial discrimination in Shelley v. Kraemer is sufficient to
distinguish it from a situation involving age-restrictive covenants, even
though all other relevant factors remain the same.2t 5
205. See Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 11 n.9 (Ist Cir. 1972).
206. See Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971).
207. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
208. Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7, 11 n.9 (1st Cir. 1972).
209. James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974).
210. Adams v. Southern Calif. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 nn.23 & 24 (9th Cir. 1973).
211. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
212. Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1359 (N.D.N.C. 1974).
213. Pease v. Havelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118, 121 (D. Neb. 1972).
214. Oler v. Bank of Am., 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Some states have also recognized
the distinction; see, e.g., Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 496, 375 A.2d 998 (1977).
215. It may also be that the specific situation before the court may differ from Shelley in another
way. In Shelley, the result of the enforcement of the covenant would have been to force an unwilling
party to discriminate. If a suit is brought againsta violator in a situation not involving sale or rental to a
third party, e.g., where a couple who is subject to the covenant acquires a child, this unwilling
discrimination would not be the case. In the view of some, this may be important in determining the
presence of state action. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 331 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); Pollak,
supra note 197, at 13.
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It would be a mistake, however, to place too much reliance on this
distinction. First, the difficulty that the courts have had in articulating the
basis for the "double standard" would be exaggerated in a case where the
facts were otherwise very similar to Shelley,216 and courts may be reluctant
to decide the case upon grounds that have little theoretical foundation.
Second, Shelley has been relied on by lower federal courts to support a
finding of state action when neither race nor restrictive covenants were
involved.2
17
In addition, direct support for the application of Shelley outside the
racial context can be found in at least one United States Supreme Court
case, even though reliance upon Shelley was apparently not necessary to a
finding of state action. In Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson"8 the
Court was faced with the constitutionality of a union shop agreement
executed between a railway union and the Union Pacific Railway. Union
shop agreements were specifically authorized (but not required) by the
Railway Labor Act, but were contrary to a provision in the Nebraska
Constitution prohibiting such agreements. The plaintiff, a Nebraska resi-
dent and an employee of Union Pacific, asserted that the union shop agree-
ment violated the first amendment guarantee of religious freedom, since it
required the workers to be available for Sunday work. The defendant
union responded that the agreement that required the Sunday work was a
contract between private parties and involved no action of the state
infringing upon first amendment liberties.
The Court found the presence of state action, despite the fact that the
federal statute was permissive, that is, it did not require union shop
agreements. The Court stated that the federal statute was "the source of
power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed. '21 9
In a footnote to this quoted phrase, the Court further stated, citing Shelley
v. Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson, that "once courts enforce the
agreement the sanction of government is, of course, put behind them. 220
Thus, the Court seemed to indicate that the mere enforcement of union
shop agreements by courts constituted state action for purposes of the first
amendment, apart from the "authorizing" power of the federal statute.221
Lower federal courts have directly held Shelley to be applicable in
non-racial contexts. In Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Local No. 2548, United
216. See generally Wechsler, supra note 197.
217. See text accompanying notes 222-25 infra.
218. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
219. 351 U.S. at 232.
220. Id. nA.
221. Since the presence of the federal statute alone was sufficient under the Court's analysis for a
finding of state action, the footnote would seem superfluous if the Court meant to limit the application
of Shelley to instances where state action is supported by some independent ground. On the other hand,
if the Court meant to analogize the federal statute in Hanson with the common law policy in Shelley,
the extension of Shelley outside the racial arena becomes even more apparent.
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Textile Workers,222 the court applied the reasoning of Shelley to the ques-
tion whether an employer could penalize employees who refused to work
on Sunday for religious reasons, when the union contract permitted
assignment of employees to Sunday work. In finding the requisite state
action for application of the first amendment, the court stated:
Second, and more importantly, I find the requisite government action
furnished by this Court's action [in enforcing the agreement], under the
reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer . . . . In Shelley, the Supreme Court held
that a private agreement which would be unconstitutional if entered into by
the state was valid, so long as its terms were voluntarily adhered to by the
private parties. The Court concluded, however, that any attempt to seek
judicial enforcement of the agreement would sufficiently involve the
state . . . so as to preclude enforcement. Both the Supreme Court and the
First Circuit have acknowledged the applicability of Shelley to the
enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement.2u
Similarly, the court in Linscott v. Millers Falls Co.,22 4 the First Circuit case
relied on in Ciba-Geigy, found Shelley to be applicable to a collective
bargaining contract.225
Despite these cases, Shelley has seldom been extended beyond the
racial arena, and courts have expressly warned of the dangers of relying
upon the reasoning of the case to support its application in other areas.Y
In addition, Hanson relied upon the presence of a federal statute, which
served to invalidate state law, for its finding of state action, as well as the
reasoning of Shelley, and may not.have found Shelley applicable absent
227the neutralization of state law by the federal statute. Also, the only cases
outside the racial context in which direct reliance is placed upon Shelley
are in the labor relations field, and the Court, cognizant of the dangers of
over-extension, may seek to limit its application to the two well-defined
areas of racial discrimination and labor relations.
228
Nevertheless, the application of Shelley to an age-restrictive covenant
is a substantial possibility. No rationale that has been relied on by the
courts to limit Shelley is likely to be applicable, except the racial
distinction.229 If faced with compelling factual similarities to Shelley,
222. 391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975).
223. Id. at 298 (citation omitted).
224. 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971).
225. The court in Linscott clearly viewed the Hanson case as an extension of the Shelle),case. In
extending Hanson to apply to the Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No.80-101,61 Stat. 136
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976)), the court answered a contention that court action against the
collective bargaining agreement had to waitan enforcement action, by stating that Hanson had already
"bridged the gap" between Shelley and the situation before the court, and therefore an enforcement
action was not necessary before state action would be present.
226. See, e.g., Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1120-21 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
227. But see Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971).
228. This may be especially true since few substantive violations have been found in the labor
relations area. See, e.g., Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
229. But see note 215 supra.
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except for the racial aspect, and the inability to construct a reasoned basis
for multivaried levels of "state action," I think the Court would determine
Shelley to be applicable.230
While case authority involving age-restrictive covenants is limited to
Riley, it is safe to say that additional cases can be expected. The continued
development of age-restrictive living environments utilizing individually-
owned units, and the likelihood that restrictive covenants involve only
230. The Court has articulated at least two, and perhaps three, other bases for finding state
action in "non-obvious" cases. I shall call these three theories the "state function" theory, the "state
contacts" theory, and the "state authorization/encouragement" theory. The state function theory
proceeds from the case of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The basis ofthis theory is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 249-53 infra. The genesis of the state contacts theory is Burton v,
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), a case in which a restaurant's refusal to serve Black
patrons was found to be state action. The restaurant was the lessee of the Parking Authority, which was
clearly a state agency. The crux of the decision seems to be that the relationship was a close and
continuous one, and was to the mutual advantage of each. The Court has described the relationship
present in the case as "symbiotic". See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972). The
"state authorization/encouragement" theory has as its basis the Hanson case and the case of Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Hanson is discussed in the text accompanying notes 218-21 supra,
Two of these are fully discussed in relation to cases involving age-restrictive covenants in another
article. See Doyle, supra note 10, at 101-05. While I do not concur entirely with Professor Doyle's
reasoning in the cited article, I do believe that her conclusions with respect to the non-applicability of
the other two theories are correct. My disagreement with her lies in the fact that I do not view the case of
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1975), as constituting as severe a restriction on
Burton as Professor Doyle apparently believes. As she notes, the Court in Burton emphasized the
mutually beneficial, i.e., "symbiotic" nature of the relationship and this facet of Burton has been
stressed in later cases. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972); and Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. at 357-58. Ifa symbiotic relationship was present in Jackson, it was
clearly a symbiosis of a different sort. The heavy regulation by the state in that case was not the result of
a choice by the electric company, but was imposed by the state. Much of it, I am sure, was not desired by
the company, and did not operate to its benefit. It is certainly arguable that the Court is more likely to
impute state action to private parties where the relationship with the state is initiated by the private
party and operates to its benefit. In addition, it is very unlikely that the state benefitted from the
unconstitutional practice itself in Jackson, as may have been the case in Burton if the exclusionary
policy had the effect of increasing white patronage, thereby permitting a higher rent.
Despite these very minor disagreements, I agree with Professor Doyle's conclusion that no
"symbiotic" relationship would be likely to exist in the case of age-exclusive restrictive covenants.
Finally, I do not believe that a fourth theory based upon the case of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967), is applicable to age-restrictive covenants. Reitman is the case in which the Court
determined that an amendment to the California Constitution prohibiting the state from denying,
limiting, or abridging "the right of any person ... to decline to sell, lease or rent ... to such person
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses," violated the fourteenth amendment, 387 U.S. at
371. The Court found that the amendment constituted state "authorization" and "encouragement" of
racial discrimination, especially since it had the effect of repealing recently enacted state civil rights
statutes.
In enforcing private age-restrictive covenants, however, the state neither seeks to "authorize" or
"encourage" private discriminations. Assuming that the basis for enforcing such a covenant is a state
policy to enforce all restrictive covenants meeting the age-neutral requirements of state property law,
Shelley would seem to be much closer to the mark. If Shelley were held not to be applicable, it is hard to
see how Reitman would be held to apply.
It is interesting to note that while the mere enforcement of age-restrictive covenants pursuant to a
common law policy would present a case similar to Shelley, Arizona has gone further in its protection
of age-restrictive covenants. An amendment to a statute which makes it illegal to refuse to rent to a
family because of the presence of children, modifies this prohibition in two significant ways. First, it
makes it illegal for a person to rent or lease his property to persons with children living with them if the
result would be the violation of a valid restrictive covenant against the sale of such property to persons
with children living with them. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 33-1317(B) (Supp. 1977-78). Second, it forbids the
rental or lease of property to persons having children when the property lies within a subdivision
designed, advertised, and used as an exclusive adult subdivision. Id. Initial violation is made
punishable by fine and imprisonment. There seems little doubt that a prosecution brought under this
statute would be state action. The state is not merely enforcing a private agreement as in Shelley, but
A GE-RESTRICTIVE HOUSING
private action, will result in continued use of those covenants as an age-
restrictive device. Litigation which results will again present the courts
with the intractable and as yet unresolved issue of defining the limits of the
Shelley doctrine.
B. Condominium Rules
Two recent cases, Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc.231 and
Ritchey v. Villa Neuva Condominium Association,232 illustrate another
context in which attempts have been made to restrict occupancy to adults.
In Franklin, the challenged mechanism was an article in the Declaration of
Condominium barring occupancy by children below the age of 12,33 and
in Ritchey it was a rule of the condominium association prohibiting
residence by children under 18.234
Only in Franklin were constitutional objection to the restrictions
made and considered, and the court upheld those objections in a brief
conclusory paragraph. The court merely stated that the case dealt with "a
number of rights which the Supreme Court of the United States has labeled
'fundamental': the right to marry . . . and the right to procreate
... and the right to marital privacy. . . . This restriction is an
unconstitutional violation of this defendant's rights to marry and
procreate.' '235 The court did not discuss why it felt that such a restriction
violated the defendant's rights to marry and procreate, nor did it discuss
the potential issue of state action.236
While the court in Ritchey did not consider whether the age
restrictions relating to occupancy were constitutional, it did consider
whether they were "reasonable. 237 Relying in part on Riley v. Stoves,238
where constitutional objections were considered, the court concluded that
the restrictions were indeed reasonable. It viewed the age restriction as a
legitimate means to meet the needs of adults whose lives would presumably
be disrupted by the presence of small children.239
making punishable, as an offense against the state, action which violates a particular type of private
agreement. Thus, the violator contends not only with the power conferred by the confluence of the
private agreement and a neutral state policy of enforcing private agreements in general, but with the
police power of the state invoked specifically to enforce a particular type ofprivate agreement. Seealso
Note, Neither Seen Nor Heard: Keeping Children Out of Arizona's Adult Communities Under
Arizona Revised Statutes Section 33-1317(B), 1975 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 813, 820-21.
231. 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. App. 1977).
232. 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978).
233. 358 So. 2d at 1087-88.
234. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 691, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
235. 358 So. 2d at 1088.
236. See text accompanying notes 240-56 infra.
237. The issue of the"reasonableness" of the age restrictions was discussed in the context of CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1355 (West. Supp. 1979) which makes "reasonable" restrictions established by the owner
of a condominium project, and amendments thereto established by a majority of the owners of
individual units, enforceable as equitable servitudes. 81 CaL App. 3d at 696, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 699 n.7.
238. 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974). See text accompanying notes 185-98 supra.
239. 81 CaL Appl 3d at 695, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
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Underlying Franklin and Ritchey for purposes of the constitutional
analysis is again the problem of state action. Of course, it would be possible
to rely upon Shelley to find state action, and the arguments would be
similar to those previously discussed.240 In addition, however, it may be
possible to rely upon the "state contacts," "state function," and "state
authorization" theories241 to a greater degree than in the case of restrictive
covenants because of the peculiar nature of condominium ownership.
Condominium ownership is largely a creature of statute and would
not exist, at least in its present form, 242 without the comprehensive
legislative enactments that govern in detail the nature of the estate and the
relationship of the unit owners.243 Thus, the "contacts" with the state are
much more comprehensive and detailed than in a typical situation
involving restrictive covenants. In addition, the state statutes generally
contain provisions authorizing governance of the condominium by rules
established by the condominium association.244 Consequently, it can be
argued that the "authorization" for a rule that discriminates against
families with children is expressly embodied in the statute. As in Hanson,
the state statute is the "source of the power and authority by which any
private rights are lost or sacrificed." 24 To be sure, Hanson considered a
situation in which a federal statute overrode a contrary state law, while the
present case concerns the authorization of a particular relationship that
was simply not present at common law. Also, the federal statute in Hanson
authorized the particular act that was alleged to be constitutionally
defective (the existence of a union shop), while the present case deals with
only a general rulemaking capacity.
While there is some force to these arguments distinguishing Hanson,
their impact is lessened somewhat by Reitman, at least with respect to the
latter objection. Although Reitman was a case in which particular civil
rights statutes guaranteeing freedom from discrimination were over-
turned, unlike Hanson there was no direct state-federal conflict. Also, the
state constitutional amendment at issue in Reitman did not specifically
permit racial discrimination, but merely prohibited the state from
240. See text accompanying notes 194-230 supra. Application of Shelley to condominium
restrictions is at once more and less compelling than in a restrictive covenant case. Since the factual
similarities to Shelley are not as great, a court is not presented with the difficulty of explaining a
different result when the sole distinguishing factor is the presence of racial discrimination in one case
and not in the other. See text accompanying note 216 supra. On the other hand, such restrictions are
often made enforceable pursuant to direct and explicit legislative authorization. See note 237 supra and
text accompanying notes 245, 246 infra.
241. See note 230 supra.
242. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 247-48, 250 (2d ed. 1975).
243. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1350-60 (West Supp. 1979).
244. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355 (West. Supp. 1979).
245. 351 U.S. at 232. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1355 (West Supp. 1979) making reasonable
restrictions established by majority vote of the owners of units in a condominium project enforceable as
equitable servitudes. It is doubtful that such restrictions would have been enforceable as such at
common law, especially since an owner who purchased before a restriction was passed could hardly




interfering with the right of a person to discriminate for any reason in the
sale or rental of housing.246 While I believe neither Hanson nor Reitman to
be controlling in cases involving condominiums, an argument based upon
these cases is far from superfluous.
At the same time it should be kept in mind that the acceptance of these
arguments would be, to a large extent, the exaltation of form over
substance, and would be a substantial extension of prior authority in an
area marked by recent judicial conservatism. 247  Condominium
associations serve in large part as functional equivalents of homeowners
associations and other organizations formed in conjunction with
cooperative ownership, but are not governed in detail by state enabling
legislation. It seems very unlikely, however, that a court would view the
activities of such organizations as "state action. 248 Yet to subject
condominium associations, but not their functional analogs, to fourteenth
ammendment scrutiny would seem a distinction without a difference.
Thus, a court may be reluctant to apply the state contacts theory to age
discrimination by condominium associations. It should also be
remembered, however, that "state action" questions do not lend
themselves to principled distinctions. Because there are quantitative, as
well as qualitative, aspects to the problem, the line between state and
private action must to some extent be arbitrary.
Finally, there exists an argument based upon the "state function"
case of Marsh v. Alabama.249 In Marsh the Court held that the proprietor
of a "company town" was subject to the constraints of the first and
fourteenth amendments, since the proprietor had assumed the functions
normally undertaken by local government. After an initial willingness to
expand the Marsh rationale,250 the Court has recently restricted its
scope.25' This unwillingness to extend Marsh, however, has occurred
almost exclusively in the context of first amendment claims involving
suburban shopping centers that arguably had assumed the public function
of the center-city business district where the thoroughfares were public. In
contrast, many condominiums have undertaken duties which are closer to
those undertaken by the "company town" in the Marsh case. Functions
such as recreational facilities, garbage collection, street and sidewalk
maintenance, and other functions are typically assumed by the con-
252dominium association. Further, as suggested by Professor Doyle,2 3 the
246. See note 230 supra.
247. See e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
248. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (where racial discrimination by a
private club was held not to constitute state action despite presence of state regulation as a result of a
state liquor license held by the club).
249. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
250. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
251. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
252. See FERRER & STECHER, 1 LAW OF CONDOMINIUM 508 (1967).
253. Doyle, supra note 10, at 103.
254. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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larger the area encompassed by the condominium, the more the scheme of
land use restrictions takes on the character of zoning legislation. An
absence of governmental land use controls as a result of widespread private
restrictions would make such an argument even stronger.
Of course, the particular facts of the case, that is, the functions
actually assumed by the condominium association, would be important to
any assertion of state action based upon Marsh. While it is not at all
apparent that such an argument would inevitably fail, the present Court
has not indicated any proclivity to extend Marsh.
Finally, even though a finding of state action is not dictated by any of
the theories or the cases upon which they are based, "to fashion and apply a
precise formula for recognition of state responsibility" has been
acknowledged by the Court to be "an impossible task." '254 Thus, the
cumulative effect of the state involvement in the condominium situation
may be sufficient to constitute state action. While race is not involved, as in
the Shelley case, a system of comprehensive state regulation is present that
did not exist in Shelley.255 The impact of the state involvement, while not
sufficient under any single theory of state action, may have a sufficient
cumulative effect to satisfy the constitutional standard.256
The scant and divided nature of the case authority provides no basis
for predicting the outcome of future cases involving condominium rules.
While the applicability of Shelley to such cases is les; likely than in cases
involving restrictive covenants, the force of other state action arguments is
greater. Overall, however, because of the difficulty of distinguishing
Shelley in a principled manner in the restrictive covenant cases, there is
probably less likelihood that the requisite state action will be found.
C. Rental Housing
It is perhaps surprising that the situation presently causing the most
widespread difficulty for excludees-rental housing-has produced the
smallest volume of litigation raising constitutional issues of age-restrictive
practices. I have found only one appellate case in which constitutional
objections to an eviction or refusal to rent on age-restrictive grounds were
raised,257 and they were disposed of by the court without discussion. While
generally the area of rental housing has seen the most legislative activity,258
most states still have no laws prohibiting age-restrictive renting.259 It is
255. Although the relationship is not a "symbiotic" one as in Burton, activities which are usually
the function of the state may be present, unlike Burton.
256. See Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
257. Flowers v. John Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971).
258. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
259. The recent case of Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 47 U.S.L.W. 2437 (Cal. Super. App, Div.
1978) concerned the application of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. Civ. CODL § 51 (West Supp, 1979),
to an instance of a refusal by an owner to rent to a family because there were children in the household,
The Act does not, on its face, include children within the classes expressly protected against
discrimination (only "discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national
[Vol. 40: 295
A GE-RESTRICTIVE HOUSING
likely that one of the reasons constitutional theories have been so
infrequently raised in this context is that a successful theory of state action
seems difficult to construct.
The problem of age-restrictive renting probably occurs in one of three
ways: an initial refusal by the landlord to rent to families with children, a
refusal to renew a lease at the end of its term because of the presence of
children, and a covenant in the lease permitting the landlord to terminate
the lease if children later occupy the premises. In none of these contexts
does the prospect of a court finding state action appear high, although
there are a few cases that indicate that such a search is not a hopeless
endeavor, especially where the machinery of state government would be
necessary to accomplish the discriminatory purpose, for example, to evict
a tenant for breach of a covenant prohibiting children.
The first possibility, an initial refusal to rent, seems least vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. In fact, this seems to be a paradigm of the
"private discrimination" that the Civil Rights Cases and Shelley held the
Constitution not to reach. The state is not enforcing, authorizing, or
encouraging the discrimination complained of; the landlord is merely
choosing to whom he or she desires to rent. While such private conduct
may be in violation of a state or federal statute,260 especially if the
discrimination is racial in nature,26 ' a constitutional challenge to a mere
refusal to rent because of private discriminatory motives has never been
upheld.
If the landlord attempts to enforce an age-restrictive policy by
refusing to renew the leases of those who are found to have children
occupying the premises, perhaps a slim basis for finding state action exists.
In a small number of cases, courts have indicated that if state processes for
unlawful detainer are employed to evict a tenant after the term of the lease
has expired, there exists state action and the eviction procedures cannot be
used to further a discriminatory purpose. Such cases are few-one
concerns race,262 and none deal with age discrimination. Constitutional
challenges to eviction based upon exercise of first amendment rights,
however, have been upheld263 and, as previously mentioned, courts have
indicated that the scope of private action may be greater when first
origin" is specifically precluded). Relying upon priorcases, however, the court interpreted thestatute to
prohibit any "arbitrary" discrimination. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205,474 P.2d 992,90 Cal. Rptr. 24
(1970).
In determining that the lower court had not found facts necessary to uphold a landlord's
exclusionary policy, the court stated that the proper test under the statute was a balancing test that
takes into account the housing needs of both families with children and persons desiring to avoid
children. While the basis of the decision was entirely statutory, this author obviously thinks a similar
approach appropriate for the resolution of constitutional issues.
260. See, e.g., Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 47 U.S.L.W. 2437 (Cal. Super. App. Div. 1978).
261. See note 2 supra.
262. Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962).
263. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Cf. Newby v. Alto Rivera
Apts., 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 CaL Rptr. 547 (1976) (dicta).
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amendment, rather than fourteenth amendment, rights are involved.264
Also, since the eviction of a tenant already present would be more
disruptive than the mere refusal to rent, a court may be more likely to find
state action present.265
The weight of authority, however, is against the application of Shelley
to this situation.266 The cases generally indicate that there must be more
state involvement than the use of neutral eviction procedures to effect the
discriminatory action,267 and emphasize the potential open-endedness of
the Shelley doctrine if applied to such cases. 268 The trend, if indeed a trend
can be discerned from the small number of cases, indicates that state action
is unlikely to be found.
Perhaps the most likely situation in which state action would be found
is that in which the age-restrictive provision consists of a leasehold
covenant agreed to by the tenant, which if broken gives the landlord the
option to terminate the lease. Such a situation would more closely parallel
the facts of Shelley and would require the court to take cognizance of the
age of the occupant and the discriminatory purpose of the covenant before
enforcing it, a factor that a number of courts have felt was very important
in determining the boundaries of the Shelley doctrine.269 In addition, the
enforcement of the covenant would cause the premature termination of a
leasehold, not merely the refusal to renew an already expired lease. Thus,
the court would be assisting the landlord in exercising a right to evict that
would not otherwise be present absent the discriminatory clause. The
differences, however, between a refusal to renew and a premature
termination are not compelling and a court would probably be unlikely to
treat them differently.
Neither Shelley nor the other Supreme Court slate action cases have
been used to invalidate such a covenant, although no case on point has
been found. A court may also be less likely to invalidate a nonracial
covenant than a racial one, thus bringing into play the "double standard"
of state action.270 In addition, enforcement of such a covenant does not
force an unwilling party to discriminate, as some have argued to be the
basis of Shelley.271 Further, it is difficult to argue, at least with respect to a
264. Powev. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687,693 (D.C. Cir,
1968).
265. Cf. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. at 506 (defining state action as essentially a
policy decision rather than a strictly legal determination).
266. Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973); Aluli v. Trusdell, 54 Haw. 417,
508 P.2d 1217 (1973); Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D,N.Y. 1970).
267. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.
1972).
268. Aluli v. Trusdell, 54 Haw. at 422, 508 P.2d at 1221. But see Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt,
299 F. Supp. at 506 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
269. See, e.g., Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d at 11; Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1120
(N.D. Ohio 1974). See also Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
270. See text accompanying notes 201-16 supra.
271. See Parks v. Mr. Ford, 68 F.R.D. 305, 313 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Adams v. Southern Calif. Nat'l
Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 337 (9th Cir. 1973); Pollak, supra note 197, at 13.
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landlord occupying a single building, that he is performing a public
function similar to zoning, as where a large developer employs restrictive
covenants to determine land use over a large area.
Finally, courts are wary of extending the state action doctrines of
Shelley, Burton, Reitman, and Marsh because there is very little in the way
of logical limitation. In many cases it becomes almost intuitivejudgement,
delicately balancing the duty of the state to be free from engaging in
unwarranted discrimination with the private right to act without concern
that the state's social views will be imposed upon us, at least outside of the
representative process. The balance, of course, is a precarious one,
especially for a nation that envisions itself a bastion of both freedom and
equality. While it has been advocated that the state action concept be
greatly expanded,272 such a route is not only unnecessary, but probably
dangerous. Excessive use of the coercive power of the state outside the
representative process creates resentment, hostility, and a feeling of
powerlessness. It leaves no room for man to engage in the "foibles and
irrationalities 273 that constitute so much of the psychological value of
political freedom. Certainly the state should seek to set a moral example by
disassociating itself from private discrimination. Perhaps, however, we
cannot and should not ask the Constitution to do much more.
As previously mentioned, there have been virtually no appellate cases
dealing with discrimination in rental housing. It might be useful, however,
to briefly address the question of whether measures designed to exclude
children from rental housing would be validated if it is assumed that state
action were present. While much of the discussion dealing with the validity
of age-restrictive zoning measures would be relevant to a determination of
the validity of age restrictions in rental housing,274 there are distinctions
that may be important for purposes of constitutional analysis. First, the
motivations of the discriminatory landlord may be very different from the
reasons prompting an age-exclusive zoning ordinance. A landlord is likely
to be motivated by a belief that renting to families with children is more
likely to result in damage to the premises, or by the fear that the presence of
children may increase the likelihood of accident and consequently increase
the likelihood of a tort suit. While the protection of such interests arguably
serves the general welfare,275 the empirical validity of the assertions is open
to doubt. In addition, unrelated discriminatory actions by individual
landlords are less likely to result in benefit to those recognized by society to
have legitimate needs that can only be met by age-restrictive housing. For
272. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pun. Aii. 107,153 (1976). In this
intriguing article, Professor Fiss suggests that any law which, in a given situation, operates to the
disadvantage of certain groups is sufficient to establish the presence of state action, whether or not the
legislation is facially neutraL
273. See Henkin, supra note 197, at 488; Doyle, supra note 10, at 1014.
274. See text accompanying notes 102-49 supra.
275. As a general matter, it is usually viewed as desirable to permit persons to take action to
preserve and protect their property. Whether the state should permit it to be done in this manner is,
of course, a different question.
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example, a city apartment that is in no way different from other
apartments, but that the landlord refuses to rent to families with children,
is likely to be leased to adults who do not care one way or the other whether
children are permitted in the other apartments in the building. This differs
from the situation in which the housing is planned and developed to meet
the needs of the class of people that society recognizes has a legitimate need
to be free of children, such as a retirement community. Also, as the
276 of+statistics previously recited indicate, much of the discrimination in
rental housing is occurring in the area where it has the greatest adverse
impact on society-the large urban area where there is the greatest
shortage of suitable housing for residents of the community. Finally, it
may be that individual discriminatory actions on the part of landlords,
excluding families with children, would not be deemed to satisfy any need
that is recognized as a legitimate governmental interest and therefore not
even satisfy the general welfare standard. Even if a court is willing to
recognize the legitimacy of the interests served by age-restrictive renting
after considering the factors just mentioned, it is likely the balancing
process of the courts in a particular case will be substantially different from
that employed in a case of age-restrictive zoning.
The rental context is likely to provide the most fertile ground for both
future litigation and scholarly commentary.277 For many families,
especially those of child bearing age, the cost of a single-family residence,
or even a condominium, has become prohibitive, 271 and this phenomenon
is not likely to disappear in the near future.279 Thus, more families that
include small children are likely to turn to rental housing.
At the same time, reliance on constitutional claims seems least
promising in this context. The presence of state action seems unlikely and
the legitimate interests of the landlord, not present in other contexts, must
be considered. There is, however, increasing evidence of a favorable
legislative response at the local level to the plight of such families, 280 and
perhaps the legislature is the most desirable forum for its resolution.281
276. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
277. See, e.g., Dunaway & Blied, Discrimination Against Children in Rental lousing: A
California Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA LAW. 21 (1979).
278. The median sales price for a new single-family home in the second quarter of 1978 was
$55,200. The average purchase price for existing homes financed through conventional first mort-
gage loans in 1978 was $55,100. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OFTIIE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1978, at 800-01 (99th ed. 1978).
279. If anything, the trend is accelerating. From 1965 to 1970 the increase in the median sales
price of a new single-family home increased from $20,000 to $23,400 ot a modest 17%. From 1970 to
1975 the increase was from $23,400 to $39,300 or 68%. From 1975 to tile second quarter of 1978 the
median price jumped from $39,300 to $55,200, or an increase of 40% in just 3-1/2 years. U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIlE UNITED STATES 1978,
at 800-01 (99th ed. 1978).
280. Dunaway & Blied, supra note 277, at 51.




I have intended this paper as an examination of the constitutional
aspects of age-restrictive housing. I have focused both on the substantive
constitutional questions, especially on privacy and procreation rights, and
on the threshold questions of state involvement. Perhaps the Constitution
is not the best means of resolving the questions posed by this situation.
Each side in the controversy can claim, with some justification, the
infringement of legitimate interests, and the extent of relative infringement
can vary greatly. Thus, a flexibility may be required that is not present in
the framework of constitutional analysis, and that consequently is more
amenable to legislative compromise. On the other hand, the very
importance of the interests which may be involved and the potential for
substantial infringement of these interests are such that we should be wary
of deciding that constitutional guarantees have no relevance. It is
suggested that the due process approach outlined in this paper provides the
appropriate decisional context. It permits substantial deference to the
legislature while providing the most flexible mode of constitutional
analysis. At the same time, it serves to insure that no interests must look
solely to the majoritarian process for their protection.
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